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INTRODUCTION
Legal education is in crisis. A surplus of law graduates,
facing limited job prospects, is flooding the market. The
institutions that train them are the focus of biting criticism.
Schools stand accused of remaining obsessed with meeting
numerical targets that bear limited relationship to actual
educational value, of producing academic writing with marginal
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utility, and of failing to prepare their graduates for actual
careers.
For an American audience, this may appear all too familiar.
Bloggers, mainstream media, and academic publications have
raised the problems of American legal education to the
forefront of popular consciousness.'
Less well understood is that a parallel phenomenon is
occurring across the Pacific. In short, the Chinese legal
education bubble is deflating.
This may come as a surprise to some. In the late twentieth
century, China undertook sweeping legal reforms. Authorities
rebuilt courts and law schools that had fallen into disrepair
under decades of Maoist radicalism. Officials issued torrents of
laws and regulations as they sought to build an institutional
framework for the reform era. Private law firms emerged as the
state-owned economy withered.
Given these shifts, Chinese legal education seemed to have
a bright future. For students, law was one of the most sought-
after majors in the late 1990s. Offering prospects of high-paying
careers, it was chosen by the best students.2 For academics, the
rapid expansion of Chinese law schools opened up new teaching
positions. Central Leaders' decision in 1997 to make "rule by
law" a core Party plank promised a key role for legal scholarship
in charting the future course of the nation.3 Politically, a range
of Chinese and foreign intellectuals held out hope that law
schools might emerge as training ground for ideas and
personnel that would lead China in the direction of liberal
institutional reform.
However, recent trends have called all of these assumptions
into question.
In the past fifteen years, Chinese legal education has grown
exponentially. Although law schools, faculty, and students have
1. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILIN, LAw SCHOOLS (2012); Richard A.
Matasar, The Rise and Fall ofAmerican Legal Education, 49 N.Y.. SCH. L. REV. 465 (2004);
David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8. 2011, at BUl; Paul Campos
& Deborah Jones Merritt, Inside the Law School Scam,
http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2012); THIRD TIER
REALITY. http://thirdtierreality.blogspoL.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
2. See infra note 55 and acconpanying text.
3. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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risen six-fold, job prospects have not kept pace. Employment
rates for law graduates now rank among the lowest in all of
higher education. Students are cautioned against selecting law
as a major; schools are advised to shrink the size of their law
programs .4
Top-down policies employed to expand Chinese legal
education have generated extremely negative side effects. Since
the late 1990s, Chinese authorities have encouraged
competition among schools and professors based on success in
meeting one-size-fits-all slates of numerical targets, such as the
size of school facilities and numbers of articles published. This
has pushed schools ranging from national research universities
to local teachers colleges to pursue a monotonously uniform
development track, regardless of the practical needs of their
students. It has produced a boom in building campus facilities
in remote suburban areas. It has led professors to churn out
large numbers of low-quality academic articles. And it has
contributed to a widespread culture of academic fraud, as
schools and professors have developed extensive
countermeasures to feign compliance with targets set by higher
authorities.5
Chinese legal education is also facing shifts in the broader
political winds. Since the early 2000s, social stability concerns
have led Chinese authorities to doubt reforms enacted in the
1980s and 1990s that had emphasized the role of law, litigation,
and courts in the resolution of citizen grievances. As a result,
central authorities have de-emphasized formal law, court
adjudication, and judicial professionalization. And they have
revived pre-1978 Maoist court mediation practices.6
This Article argues that these trends are collectively
prompting a broad reconsideration of legal education in China.
Numbers of Chinese law students are beginning to decline.
Educational officials have announced that they will limit or close
university programs that fail to produce employable graduates.
Authorities are backing away from 1990s-era one-size-fits-all
models for evaluating law programs. Instead, they are prodding
4. See infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
6. See Carl F. Minzncr, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011)
(discussing these trends).
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schools to differentiate themselves. And Party political-legal
authorities have questioned to what extent legal education
should be refashioned to correspond to the new official line
regarding law and legal institutions in China.
This Article contrasts with much of the existing English-
language literature on legal education in China. Existing works
have emphasized the large numerical increases in Chinese law
students, professors, and schools in recent decades.7 But they
have not fully analyzed the negative consequences of this
growth.8 Nor have they examined the new track that central
leaders have now chosen for Chinese law schools.
These trends are important for American law professors
and administrators, even absent any deep interest in China.
Some of these pressures bear strong similarities to those faced by
legal education in the United States. Employment rates have
plunged. Student interest is waning. And tighter central
government regulation (in the form of restrictions on federal
student tuition dollars) is looming. As American legal educators
begin to plan how they themselves will adapt in a new era, they
may wish to examine the reform track in Chinese legal
education.
But China's relevance is even more direct: cold hard cash.
Tuition from foreign LL.M. students keeps many US law schools
afloat. This dependence is only going to increase. Numbers of
American J.D. applicants have declined by thirty-eight percent
since 2010. 9 Further declines are likely in coming years.
American law schools will likely attempt to respond to these
pressures by significantly expanding their foreign LL.M.
programs. Many already have. For many schools, China is the
single most important market for foreign students. The viability
of many US law schools will directly depend on the continued
availability of Chinese law graduates willing to spend their
money to purchase US degrees.
7. See Zuo Haicong, Legal Education in China: Present and Future, 34 OKLA. CITY U.
L. RLV. 51, 57 (2009); see generall Ji Weidong, Legal Education in China: A Great Leap
Forward ofProfessionalism 39 KOBL UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Zuo, supra note 7, at 57; Ji, supra note 7. But see Wang Chenguang, The
Rapid but Unbalanced Growth of China's Legal Education Programs. 7 HARV. CHINA RLV. 1
(2006).
9. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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For scholars of Chinese law and governance, this Article
offers a comprehensive look at the institutional incentives that
have driven the explosive growth of Chinese legal education
over recent decades. It identifies the critical role played by
official target responsibility systems used to evaluate Chinese
institutions of higher education. Although significantly more
influential than the American Bar Association accreditation
standards and US News and World Report rankings that have
similarly driven-and twisted-American legal education, these
systems have remained almost completely unstudied by foreign
academics.
Last, this Article also argues that the fate of legal education
can serve as a bellwether for broader legal and political reform
trends in China. Since 1978, Chinese legal education has been
intimately tied to questions of institutional reform. In the past
three decades, law schools have emerged as a somewhat
protected zone for criticism and discussion of contested political
issues. Legal academics have emerged as public intellectuals.
Many have developed national reputations as trenchant critics of
government policies. A conservative backlash against late
twentieth century legal reforms has now enveloped the courts
and bar.'0 Whether it affects Chinese legal education as well may
indicate if it has crested or will continue to spread yet further.
This Article uses multiple tools to examine the growth and
retrenchment of Chinese legal education. These include:
statistical data on law students, degrees, and schools; historical
analysis of changing educational practices; and textual
examination of new state policies. It extensively employs
Chinese-language sources, including some forty first-hand
interviews with a range of deans and professors at ten different
Chinese law schools.11
10. One of the more recent examples of these trends: the Ministry of justice
announcement in March 2012 that a loyalty oath to the Comnunist Party would be
made a requirement for admission to the bar. Zhao Yang, Sifa bu xiafa jianli litshi
xuanshi zhidu jueding de tongzhi [Ainistry ofJustice Issues Notice on Establishing System for
Lawyer's Oaths]. MINISTRY OF JLSTICE (Mar. 21, 2012),
http:/,/vy.moj.gov.cn/index/content/2012-03/21/contentS445267.htm.
11. All interviews were conducted by the author. Interviewees were informned of
tihe interview's purpose, its voluntary nature, and tihe ways the information provided
would be used. All consented verbally to be interviewed. Due to the sensitive nature of
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This Article is divided into four Parts.
Part I traces the historical development of legal education
in the People's Republic of China. It outlines changes over
recent decades in official attitudes towards legal education, state
policies for managing schools, and employment prospects for
law graduates. It identifies how these have contributed to the
massive surge in law programs since the late 1990s.
Part II analyzes the current challenges facing legal
education in China. These include massive overexpansion,
distorted institutional priorities caused by central evaluation
measures adopted in the 1990s, and recent Party political
campaigns, launched first within the Chinese court system in
2006, which have shown signs of spreading toward law schools
and academia.
Part III examines the future course of legal education in
China. In particular, it analyzes plans announced by Party
political-legal authorities and education officials in late 2011 to
reform the course of legal education in China over the next
decade.
Part IV concludes with an analysis of these trends.
1. RISE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
The history of legal education in the People's Republic of
China ("PRC") is visually represented in the following two
charts.1
the issues examined, and to preserve anonymity, only dates and locations of interviews
are given. Schools include both national and regional universities.
12. These charts depict total numbers and percentages of law (faxue) graduates
from institutes of higher education (gaodeng xuqexiao). Numbers are compiled from the
annual Statistical Yearbooks of China, published by the Statistics Bureau of China, and
from the corresponding website, where they are reported as gaodengxuexiao fenke
biyesheng shu. Several notes are in order. First, earlier periods list the Held as "politics
and law" (zhengfa) rather than "law." More recent statistics include political science,
sociology, and public security studies under faxue in addition to subjects such as civil,
commercial, and international law. The former are relatively small compared wvith the
latter. Second, these numbers include both university (benke) and junior college
(zhuanke) students-categories not broken out separately in earlier data. Third, masters
and doctoral students are not included. See Table 4 for these numbers. Fourth, this
data does not include technical high schools, adult education. or other educational
programs. Radter, these statistics give a rough idea of the number of Chinese studcnts
studying law in a tertiary education most closely approximating a college degree.
2013]
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Chart 1
Annual Numbers of Law Graduates in China
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In 1949, Communist authorities founded the modern
Chinese state. They established a one-Party political system
centered on the Communist Party. They built legal institutions
that borrowed heavily from Soviet models. Law was viewed as a
utilitarian tool to assist in the socialist modernization of China.
During the 1950s, Party authorities reformed legal
education to meet this vision. Existing law faculties were
reorganized. Some became politics and law (zhengfa) institutes
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managed by the Ministry of Justice. These produced graduates
to serve as frontline state cadres in government and judicial
institutions throughout the new socialist China." Others became
departments within comprehensive universities, such as Peking
University, focusing on training elite researchers and officials.
Naturally, all were part of broader state efforts to create an
institutionalized system of higher education, albeit a politicized
one under firm Party control. 14 Legal studies consisted of
readings of political works, translated Russian-language
materials, and new laws issued by China's nascent national
legislature. 1
Law graduates remained few and far between. A poor,
developing country, China had limited resources available for
higher education. Those that did exist were channeled into
fields (such as engineering) directly tied to state efforts to build
a centrally planned economy with heavy industry at the core."
In contrast, politics and law students represented less than one
percent of all graduates during the first thirty years of the PRC. 17
These limited efforts at building legal education collapsed
entirely during the political turmoil that engulfed China from
the late 1950s to the 1970s. Central leaders launched leftist
campaigns that criticized intellectuals, attacked formal
institutions, and fanned the flames of radical populism. This
"led to the spread of legal nihilism of despising the law,
negating the legal system and ignoring legal education." 18
Courts and government institutions were gutted; the Ministry of
Justice shuttered from 1959 to 1976.
13. See Sarah 1iddulph, Legal Education in the People's Republic of China, in LEGAL
EDUCATION IN CHINA: CLOBALIZATION, CHANGE AND CONTEXTS 260, 261 (Stacey Steele
& Kathryn Taylor eds., 2010).
14. See Barry Sautman, Politicization, Hyperpolitici.ation and Depolitici.ation of
Chinese Education, 35 CoiP. EfDnC. REV. 669, 670 (1991).
15. See Luke T. Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60
MICH. L. REV. 439, 462-66 (1962).
16. In 1957, for examplc, 56,180 students graduated from Chinese institutes of
higher education. 17,162 graduated from engineering programs and 15,948 from
teacher training programs. Only 385 graduated from politics and law programs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA. STATISTICAL YLARBOOK OF CHINA 521-22
(1983).
17. DEP'T OF P LANNING, MINISTRY OF EfDUC., AHIEVFMFNT OF EDUCATION IN
CHINA, 1949-1983, 1988 (1983).
18. Han Depci & Stephen Kanter, Legal Education in China, 32 AM.J. COMP. L. 543,
550 (1984).
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Political radicalism decimated higher education.
Hyperpoliticization resulted in purges of foreign legal ideas and
personnel trained abroad. Many law professors, as with other
intellectuals, were sent to do decades of hard labor in the
countryside. During the most extreme years of the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76), almost all universities-and their law
programs-were closed. In Shanghai, campus facilities of the
East China Institute of Politics and Law were allocated to other
uses, including a psychiatric hospital and vegetable storage.21o
Unsurprisingly, total numbers of law graduates fell to near zero.
In the late 1970s, disillusioned with the chaos of the Maoist
era, Chinese leaders turned their backs on political radicalism.
They pursued sweeping reforms, seeking to build a stable
framework to govern China and promote economic
development. They reopened schools, launched extensive
foreign educational exchanges, and embraced legal reform.
Chinese authorities issued hundreds of new statutes and
regulations-creating a comprehensive framework of civil,
commercial, criminal, and administrative law.
Naturally, these reforms also required reviving legal
education. Authorities reopened the politics and law institutes
founded in the 1950s. They also resurrected university law
programs, increasing the numbers of four-year universities
offering law majors, from four (in the 1950s) to thirty-one in
1983.21
Revival of higher education fueled intellectual excitement.
Textbooks were an eclectic melange of old Soviet-era materials
and assorted reform-era statutes. But legal education was
intimately intertwined with politics of the day. 2 Graduates of
19. Id. at 553; Sautman, supra note 14, at 675-77.
20. Biddulph, supra note 13. at 263.
21. Huo Xiandan. Faxue jiaoyu yu falfi zhiye de biange [Changes in Legal Education
and the Legal Profession], in ZHONGGUO ZOUXIANG FAZHT 30 NAN 1978-2008 [CHINA'S
JOL RNFY TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW: LEGAL REFORM 1978-2008 161, 163 (Cai Dingjian
& Wang Chenguang eds., 2008). Total numbers of law graduates from institutes of
higher education were divided roughly equally-half came from the universities, half
from politics and law institutes.
22. Political shifts on campus enhanced the sense of change. In the late 1980s,
Chinese leaders signaled their support for deeper political reforms aimed at separating
the Party from the day-to-day management of government. Within universities, this
translated into a formal central polic announced in 1988 that supported university
president-led management systems (xiozhang fuzezhi), rather than Party committee-led
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that era recall energetic debates between students surrounding
the 1980-81 trial of Mao's wife and her associates for crimes
committed during the Cultural Revolution. They also remember
their fascination with foreign works available to them on
campus." Rapid expansion, openness to Western law, and the
possibility for deeper political and social changes generated a
flush of interest among foreign observers as well. Some depicted
Chinese legal education in glowing terms. As one noted, "legal
education is now a star in the crown of the [Chinese] academic
establishment."24
This, however, may have been somewhat romanticized.
Teaching quality remained uneven, with many professors having
been educated over four decades earlier in pre-revolutionary
China. 25 Universities labored under financial constraints
imposed by tight central budgets that devoted limited resources
to higher education. Faculty faced fixed pay structures deviating
little from school to school. Limited rewards existed for talented
scholars.N By the late 1980s and early 1990s, this had resulted in
an outflow of academic talent into the more remunerative
private sector.2
Few such opportunities existed for law students. Just as in
the 1950s, 1980s-era law graduates overwhelmingly entered state
employment. They had few other options. No private bar
existed. Employment prospects in foreign firms remained
limited. In contrast, the demand in Chinese state organs for
trained personnel was insatiable. In 1983, only three percent of
judges, procurators, and justice bureau officials held the
equivalent of a junior college degree in law or above. Over fifty-
four percent had received less than a month of legal training.28
systems. Yang Dongping, Chinese Higher Education During the Past Thirty Years, in
CHINA'S EDU CATION DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY 1978-2008, 320, 324-25 (Zhang Xiulan
ed., 2011).
23. Interview, in Beijing, China (Aug. 2, 2011).
24. R. Randle Edwards, An O i of C hi s Lw and Legal Eduration, 476
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 48 (1984).
25. Interview, in Beijing, China (Aug. 2, 2011).
26. Interview, in New York, United States (Mar. 28, 2012).
27. Interview, in Beijing, China (July 15, 2011). Few may reimeinber that the noted
liberal constitutional law theorist and public intellectual He Weifang actually quit his
teaching job in Beijing in the late 1980s because of dissatisfaction with low pay and
poor housing condiLions, to pursue a business venture.
28. Huo, supra note 21, at 164.
2013] 43
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Precisely because Chinese legal education remained
strongly tied to employment in political-legal organs, it was
relatively less popular among students. It did not offer an easy
track into well-paid positions in the private sector. Students
remained subject to somewhat tighter political scrutiny than
other fields. For this reason, as one observer in the early 1980s
reported, law is "not a popular choice of candidates for
admission to universities; it reportedly often appears as the last
preference on the list of departments [that] students include on
their applications."29
Massive state demand for legal talent, coupled with the
minuscule numbers of university graduates, meant that Chinese
legal education in the 1980s was provided by a diverse range of
institutions. The Ministry of Justice and political-legal institutes
ran short-term cadre training programs on new laws and legal
concepts for courts, police, and the procuratorate, ranging
anywhere from one to six months in length. 0 Junior colleges
and secondary technical schools trained a range of personnel
who fleshed out the lower ranks of courts and administrative
agencies. ' Graduates from these programs significantly
outnumbered those from universities.3 2
Legal education at institutes of higher education remained
relatively limited in scale during the 1980s. Total numbers of law
graduates rose from around zero in 1980 to roughly 12,000 in
the late 1980s. But they accounted for only two percent of all
graduates.3 Nor was there any substantial increase in following
years. Higher education entered a deep freeze following state
suppression of the 1989 democracy movement. Chinese
29. Timothy Gelatt & Frederick Snyder, Legal Education in China: Training for a
New Era, 1 CHINA L. REP. 41, 58 (1980-81).
30. Gelatt & Snyder, supra note 29, at 54-55.
31. Id. at 50-51. Numbers of zhuanke and benke law graduates were roughly equal
in the late 1980s. DEP'T OF PLANNING, MINISTRY OF EDnc., ACHTEVEMFNT OF
EDUCATION IN CHINA 1986-1990 28 (1990).
32. This disparity declined with the expansion of higher education. In 1982, there
were 7,000 politics and law graduates from secondary technical schools, six times the
number of similar graduates fron all institutes of higher education (both benke and
zhuanke). In 1990, although there were 20,000 politics and law graduates fron
secondary schools, this amounted to less than twice the number of graduates from
institutes of higher education. NAT'L BURLAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA. STATISTICAL
YLARBOOK OF CHINA 714 (1992).
33. Id.
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authorities scrapped earlier tentative moves towards political
reform, reintroduced Party committee leadership of schools,
and slashed the size of entering classes.34 In 1993, there were
actually fewer Chinese law graduates than in 1987.
All of this changed in the 1990s. Multiple policy shifts
contributed to a dramatic expansion of legal education.
First, Chinese authorities decided to rapidly expand higher
education across the board.Y In part, this represented a long-
range effort (begun in 1993) to raise educational levels of the
working age population. But it also was a short-term stimulus
package. Authorities sought to surmount the pressures of the
1997-98 Asian financial crisis by rapidly increasing domestic
spending on education.36 In just two years, between 1998 and
2000, entering classes of first-year students in institutes of higher
education doubled, exploding from one to two million. The
following years witnessed regular, double-digit percentage
growth in numbers of Chinese students and faculty alike.
Second, to carry out this expansion, Chinese authorities
altered how they managed academic institutions. They moved
away from 1980s-era efforts that ran schools as cogs in a state-
planned economy. Instead, they granted school administrators
more autonomy to manage the regular operations of their
institutions. They also adopted new funding mechanisms.
Central authorities significantly increased the resources available
for higher education.30
34. SeeYang, supra note 22, at 257.
35. See, e.g., Zhonggongzhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhuajiaoyu gaige quannuan
turfin suitu fiaoyu de jueding [Decision oj the Central Party Committee and State Coun cl on
Deepening Educational Reform and Comprehensive Promoting Quality Elducation],
CHINA.COM.CN, 1 9 (June 13, 1999), http://wwwchina.cori.cn/chine/zhuanti/
tyzcg/885952.htrn.
36. Yang Dongping, Gaodengjiaoyu gonggong zhengce de yanbian [ Changes in Higher
Education Policy]. in ZHONGGUO JIAOYu FAZHAN YU ZHENGCE 30 NIAN [CHINA'S
EDUCATION DFVELOPMENT AND IPOLICY 1978-2008] 251, 262-63 (Zhang Xiulan ed.,
2008).
37. Id.
38. Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyawn guanyu yinfa zhonggao iaoyu gaige yu jazhan
gangyao de tongzhi [Central Party Committee and State Council Notice on the Issuance of the
Outline for China' Elducational Reform and Development], LAw-LIB.COM.CN, 1[ 18 (Feb. 13
1993), http:/ ww .aw-lib. com/ law/ lawview. aspid=5 5745.
39. From 1997 to 2005, total expenditures on higher education in China
increased six-fold in absolute termis, doubled as a percentage of GDP, and rose froin
17.2% to 31.6% of all educational expenditures. Litao Zhao & Sixin Sheng, China's
2013]
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But they did not simply distribute the increased financial
resources equally among schools. Rather, they tied the
availability of funds to the success of schools in meeting one-size-
fits-all target evaluations aimed at building comprehensive
universities of national and international repute. Examples
included Project 211 (launched in the mid-1990s) and Project
985 (launched in 1998).40 These rewarded schools based on
subjective and numerical targets-percentages of faculty with
advanced educational credentials, numbers of academic
publications, scope of academic programs, size of school
infrastructure (campus buildings, books, labs and technical
equipment)-upon which individual schools were evaluated by
educational officials.41 Success in meeting these targets (or in
outperforming other institutions) rendered schools eligible for
designation as Project 211 or 985 institutions, and the resulting
financial and professional benefits.2
The result: frenzied competition between schools.
Educational institutions purchased expensive equipment,
Great Leap in Higher Education, NAT'L UNIT. OF SINGAPORE F. AMsA INST. BACKGROUN)
BRIEF No. 394 (July 24, 2008).
40. SeeYang, supra note 22, at 320, 351-55.
41. These systems have been repeatedly revised. For one example, see fiaoyu bu
bangongling guanyu yinfa 'Putong gaodeng xuexiao benke jiaoxue gongzuo shuiping pinggu
jang'an (shixing)' de tongthi [ Notice oj the General Office oj the MOE on the Issuance oj the
Evaluation Plan offor Four-Year University Education Work at Institutes of ligher Education
(Experimtental)], MINISTRY OF EDUC. (Aug. 12, 2004), hItp://wwwmoc.edu.cn/
piiblicfiles/business/htmliles/ moe /s3879/201010/109707.html. For others, see
Higher Education Evaluation Center. MINISTRY OF EDUC., http:w//wy.heec.edu.cn (last
visited Feb. 15. 2013)
42. For school administrators, financial rewards are certainly a major attraction
for being selected. But money is not everything. Designation as a 211 or 985 school has
evolved into a proxy for (uality, attracting stronger students and well-known professors.
These designations are also linked to other benefits-such as the ability to send top
students to masters programs at other schools without having to go through the
examination process that others must face (tuijian mianshi), or adding additional points
to their examination scores. Interview No. 1, in Beijing, China July 19, 2011). See, e.g:,
2012 Zhuoyue falfi rencai xialingying jianzhang [Information for the Sumtmer Camp for
Outstanding Legal Talent], SHANGHAI UNIV. LAw SCH. (June 19, 2012),
http://www.law.shu.edu.cn/l)efault.aspx-tabid= I 7684&ctl=)etail&mid=31880&Id=
99308 (last visited Feb. 15. 2013). The same desire-for recognition, for administrative
preferences that can help the school and professors to build themselves and their
institution-are behind the fierce competition to be allocated any of the other
admninti rative rewards that the state can bestow (such as official designation as a
boshidian - an institution able to issue Ph.D. degrees) even absent concrete financial
rewards.
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expanded their library holdings, and built sprawling satellite
campuses. They opened full slates of academic specialties.
Politics and law institutes added mathematics, journalism, and
foreign language programs. 43 Local teacher training schools and
colleges traditionally run by individual bureaus (postal, water
resources, radio, and television) all founded law programs,
regardless of whether they had the appropriate resources.4 4
Schools engaged in hiring sprees of faculty with advanced
degrees (making the late 1990s a very lucrative and attractive
time to enter academia). They created mechanisms to reward
and push faculty toward publishing larger and larger numbers of
academic articles.
Naturally, these developments were not unique to legal
education. Similar trends took place throughout Chinese
schools. But authorities also took specific steps that increased
the demand for law degrees.
Starting in the 1990s, reform-minded central authorities
launched a policy of professionalizing China's legal organs. Laws
issued in 1995 made a degree from an institute of higher
education a prerequisite for newly hired judges and
procuratorate officials. In 2001, these (as well as the Lawyers
Law) were amended to increase the basic educational
requirement to a four-year university degree. Consistent with
the new central line, authorities reworked their annual
evaluation systems for court presidents and bureau chiefs to
place greater emphasis on their success in recruiting individuals
with university, or better yet, post-graduate degrees. Graduates
from masters programs in law at elite Beijing universities around
2000 found themselves in high demand, with urban courts
around China aggressively wooing them for entry level
43. Interview, in Beijing, China (June 13, 2012).
44. Qiang Zha Diversification or Homogenization: How Governments and M4arkets Have
Combined to (Re)shape Chinese Higher Education in its Recent Massification Process, 58
HIGHER En C. 41, 44 (2009).
45. The 2001 Lawyeis Law and amended versions of the other laws required cither
a benke degree in law, or any benke degree along with "specialized legal knowledge."
P.R.C. Lawyers Law (pronulgated May 15, 1995, amended Dec. 29, 2001), art. 6,
http://way.china.cont.cn/chinese/PI-c/92291.htnm; P.R.C. Judges Law (pronulgated
Feb. 28, 1995, amended June 30, 2001), art. 9(6), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-
05/26/content 1026.htin (China); P.R.C. Procurators Law (promulgated Feb. 28,
1995, amended June 30, 2001), art. 10(6), hItp://www.gov.ci/banshi/2005-
05/26/content 1023.htm.
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positions.4 6 Unlike the 1980s, such state positions were now in
high demand. Graduates were attracted by the increased salaries
and additional perks provided to urban state cadres beginning
in the 1990s-including the opportunity to purchase previously
state-owned apartments at low prices.47
State employment was also no longer the only option for
young law graduates. Systems allocating university graduates to
jobs had disappeared by the early 1990s. In subsequent years,
Chinese authorities undertook the full privatization of the legal
profession. State-owned law firms of the 1980s gave way to
private firms in the 1990s. Lawyers changed from government
cadres to private entrepreneurs, bearing both the profit and loss
resulting from their actions. 48 Some became very wealthy,
working for successful domestic Chinese firms or for the
increasing numbers of foreign law firms in Shanghai and
Beijing.49 For many Chinese students of the late 1990s, the study
of law appeared to open a door to enticing, lucrative job
prospects in the private sector.
Ideologically, law was also very much in vogue. In the 1990s
and early 2000s, central Party authorities embraced legal reform
as a tool to advance their own governance interests. In 1997,
they adopted "rule by law" (yft zhiguo) as a core Party slogan. 0
Such central policies opened space for a range of actors to
appropriate the mantle of legal reform to advance a range of
interests. This included state actors. In the late 1990s, US and
Chinese authorities launched rule-of-law exchanges and
programs as a means of addressing human rights-related issues
46. Interview, in New York, United States (Jan. 27, 2012).
47. The 1990s witnessed the privatization of the existing housing stock owned by
Chinese state agencies and public institutions to existing residents (i.e., their
employees) at very low rates. Joyce Man, Siqi Zheng & Rongrong Ren, Housing Policy
and Housing Markets: Trends, Patterns, and Affordability, in CHINA'S HOUSING REFORM
AND OLTCOMES 3, 4 (Joyce Man ed., 2011).
48. Ethan Michelson, Unhooking from the State: China Lawyers in Transition,
64-66. (Aug. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago), available at
http:/wwwindiana.edu/~cmsoc/Publications/MichelsonDissertationVoll.pdf.
49. Foreign and Hong Kong law oflices in mainland China grew from 32 in 1995,
to 133 in 2002, and then to 203 in 2006. Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring:
International and Local Law Firms in China's Corporate Law Mlarket 42 LAw & SOC'Y RL.
771, 778, tbl. 1 (2008).
50. See Jiang Zemin, Gen. Sec'y of the Party, Address to the Fifteenth Party
Congress, available at http: C /news.xinhuaneL.comL/ziliao/2003-01/20/
content 697189.htm.
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in a politically more acceptable format. 1 But it also included
Chinese citizens themselves. By the early 2000s, a cadre of
Chinese public interest lawyers and law professors had emerged
on the national stage, adept at fusing savvy media strategies and
legal challenges to push for greater institutional and social
change.52 Law was hot.
Legal education exploded. From a handful of politics and
law institutes and elite universities in the early 1980s, numbers of
institutes of higher education with law programs increased to
over one hundred in the early 1990s. Within fifteen years, they
expanded another six-fold-reaching six hundred by 2006.53
Total numbers of law graduates from Chinese institutes of
higher education surged from 31,500 in 1999, to 163,529 in
2005, and to 208,000 in 2008. But legal education increased
proportionally as well. In 1988, law graduates accounted for only
two percent of all graduates from institutes of higher education.
By 2001, this share had tripled to six percent.54 Further, it was
the very best students who were choosing to study law. Between
1999 and 2002, law ranked annually among the top five majors
chosen by top-scoring high school graduates on the national
college entrance exam.5
Consistent with moves towards professionalization, Chinese
legal education became standardized and centered on a
university model. The 1980s-era diversity of legal educational
institutions faded. Beginning in the late 1990s, authorities
upgraded secondary technical schools of law and politics to
51. Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule ofjLaw Jitiative, I WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J.
603, 606 (2003).
52. See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, W\ eiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyers
in an Authoritarian State, 59 CHINAJ. 1 (2008).
53. Liang Huixing, Zhongguo de faxue jiaoyu Yu rencai peigang [Chinese Legal
Education and Training], CJi It AV (Mar. I1, 2009), http://www.civillawv.con.cn/
artic /default.asp?id=43425.
54. 2001 Putong gaodeng xuexiaofenke xueshengshu [2001 Number of Students by Field
of Study in Regular Higher Educational Institutions, PR.C. MINISTRY OF Ef C.,
http://wwwiN.oc.edu.cn/publiefiles/business/htmlfiles/moc/moc_85/20006/
7959.htmi (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
55. Zhongguo zui shou gaokao zhuangyuan qingiai zhuany paihangbang [China's
Ranking of Majors Most Favored by Top Scorers on College Entrance Exam)], BLIJING DAILY
(May 14, 2009) ItLp://c(du.sina.comt.cn/gaokao/2009-05-14/1610199849.shiil
[hereinafter Ranking ofMajors].
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institutes of higher education.@ They shifted administration of
the five specialized politics and law institutes from the Ministry
of Justice to the Ministry of Education and local governments
(to be managed alongside other schools) and upgraded them to
comprehensive universities. In 1998, educational authorities
promulgated a mandatory core curriculum of sixteen core
classes for undergraduate law majors. 57 In 2002, Chinese
authorities unified the previously separate entrance
examinations for the bar, courts, and procuratorate into a single
national test.
Foreign models heavily influenced Chinese legal education
as it grew. This was not new. As early as the late 1970s,
cooperative legal exchange programs had brought a generation
of Chinese legal scholars abroad as visiting scholars and non-
degree students. Upon their return to China, they propagated
foreign legal concepts among the next generation of students
and academics.58
Chinese legal academia became highly focused on the
West-specifically, the United States. This influence extended
from preferred models of graduate legal education to the
specific content of legal academic research. 59 Many Ph.D.
dissertations in law written in the 1980s and 1990s consisted of
nothing more than translated foreign statutes and cases,
imported into China. For some scholars, foreign models also
provided a convenient springboard to push for deeper reform.
56. Pei Junjie, Faxue zhongthuan jiaoya [Legal Education in Tehnical High Schools],
in FAXUL JIAOYU DE ZHONGGUO MOSHI [MODAL OF LLGAL EDUCATIO N IN CHINA] 37,
43-44 (Ji Xiangde ed., 2010) [hereinafter Legal Education in Technical High Schools].
57. Sun Yuan, Faxue benke jiaoyu [ Universit Legal Education], in FAXUF jAIOYU DF
ZHONGGUIO MOSHI [MODAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN CHINA] 125. (Ji Xiangde, ed.
2010).
58. See, e.g., Randle Edwards, Thirty Years of Legal Exchange with China: The
Columbia Law School Role, 23 COLUL .J. ASIAN L. 3. 3-7 (2009). Similar exchanges have
continued into the twenty-first century. See Yanmin Cai, Global Clinical Legal Education
and International Parnerhips A Chinese Legal Educator's Perspective 26 MD. J. INT'L L.
159, 169-70 (2011) (discussing the evolution of Chinese legal education fron its
origins as a project sponsored by the Ford Foundation); Brian Landsberg, Promoting
Social fustice Values and Reflective Legal Practice in Chinese Law Schools, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BLS. & DEV. L.J. 107 110-11 (2011) (discussing projects run by McGeorge Law
School, and funded by the United States Agency for International Development,
promoting expericntial legal education in China).
59. He Weifang, China's Legal Profession: The Emergence and Growing Pains of a
Profssion alizd Legal Class, 19 COLtUM.J. ASTAN L. 138, 147-48 (2005).
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In the 1990s, Chinese scholars reinvigorated the study of
constitutional law, advancing the concept of constitutional
supremacy (xianfa zhishang) and importing US constitutional
law materials, as part of calls for tighter limits on Chinese state
power.6o
In summary, as Chinese legal education entered the twenty-
first century, it appeared to face a future full of prospects-
growing numbers of graduates, booming employment prospects,
expanding academic research, deepening international
connections, and the promise of an important role in a nation
in which law would be increasingly influential.
II. CRISIS
This rosy future did not occur, however. Structural shifts
have undermined the underlying factors supporting rapid
growth of Chinese legal education during the late 1990s and
early 2000s.
A. Overexpansion and Unemployment
Job opportunities for new law graduates have plunged. In
part, this reflects severe employment pressures among all
Chinese college graduates.61 But it is most pronounced among
law students. In recent years, law students have ranked dead last
among all college graduates in terms of finding jobs. 62
Unsurprisingly, law programs have been "red-carded" in
educational surveys. Students have been cautioned against
60. See, eg Wu jialin, Xianfa zishang shi lianshe Jazhi guojia zhi guanlian
[Constitutional Supremacy is the Key to Constru cting a Nation Ruled by Law], 3 STUD. L &
BLs. 14 (1998).
61. Bruce Einhorn & Dexter Roberts, Aew College Grads Can't Find a job,
BiOOMBERG BUSINESSWEK (Oct. 11, 2004), http://wiw.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/04 41 /b3903067.htn; Yasheng Huang, Vhat IsA College Degree Worth in China,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, available at http://Twy.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/
12/02/what-is-a-college-degrcc-orth-in-chinai/reforii-chinas-private-sector-14.
62. Frorn 2008 to 2010, employment rates for graduates (calculated six months
after graduation) ranged between 79.5% to 86.7% for university law graduates, and 75%
to 79% for graduates with junior college law degrees. C orre sponding rates for
university graduates with engineering degrees arc 93.3% (2010), and 90% for junior
college students with tourism degrees (2010). MYCOs RESEARCH INST., 2011 ZHONGGUO
DAXLESHENG JIUYL BAOGAO [CHINLSE COLLLGL GRADUATES EMPLOYMENT ANNUAL
RLPORT (2011)] 55-56. tbl. 1-2-3 (providing the annual numbers fromn 2008 through
2010).
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choosing to study law; schools advised to shrink the size of their
law programs.3" What explains this?
In the early 1990s, law was an extremely "hot" social science
major. At that point, the rebuilding and development of
courts, procuratorates, and law firms provided large
numbers of job opportunities for legal professionals.
Demand outstripped supply. But in just ten years, the
employment situation for law graduates has experienced a
dramatic turnaround. . . .As a result of the blind expansion
in legal education, annual numbers of law graduates now
total over 100,000. This scale vastly exceeds actual
demand.64
This mismatch has dramatically affected public sector
employment prospects for law graduates. The boom of the late
1990s and early 2000s has given way to oversaturation. State
organs now find themselves deluged with hundreds of applicants
for every available position.65
Nor has the private sector lived up to the hype of the late
1990s. True, a handful of elite law firms did experience rapid
growth during the early 2000s.63 But Chinese lawyers remain
institutionally weak, beset by state pressure and market
competition from other actors. 07 Total growth in the bar
remains far from sufficient to absorb the massive numbers of
new law graduates streaming out of schools each year. Between
2000 and 2010, the number of licensed lawyers rose from
63. Id. at 118-21. Examples of other Fields receiving "red card" warnings include
animation and physical education teaching. Tong Shuquan, Daxue 20 ge zhuanye
jiayenan donghua faxue zao jinggao [Poor Employment Prospects for 20 University Majors;
Animation, Law Receive "Warnings'], BEIJTNG DATIY une 12, 2012),
http://cdu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2012-06-12/0814342895.shtml.
64. Sun, supra note 57, at 106, 111.
65. See, e.g., Mingpai daxue benke zhengqiangfaxueyuan shujiyuan gang-wei re zhengji
Graduates From Elite Universities Fight for Position as Court Secretary, Incites Controversy]
SOHU NFWS (June 24, 2007), http://news.sohu.con/20070624/n250736266.shtnl
(discussing 434 applicants, including those from elite schools, competing for a clerical
position on a Beijing court).
66. Xueyao Li & Sida Liu, The Learning Process of Globalization: How Chinese Law
Firms Survived the Financial Crisis, 80 FORDHAM L. RLV. 2847, 2851-55 (2012).
67. Sida Liu, Lawyers, State Officials and Significant Others: Symbiotic Exchange in the
Chinese Legal Services Market, 206 CHINA Q. 276 (2011).
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117,000 to 194,000-an increase of 77,000.68 Numbers of new
university law graduates in the same period: 824,000.69
Of course, one might reasonably raise the question: does
this really matter? After all, the study of law in China (as with
other civil law countries) has traditionally been an
undergraduate, rather than graduate, pursuit. Perhaps it isn't
important whether students actually end up practicing law?
But this question misses the key issue. The problem is not
that Chinese law students cannot find jobs as lawyers. Rather, it
is that they rank at the bottom of all college students in terms of
finding any job, be it public, private, legal, or non-legal. One key
reason: more than any other field of study, their education bears
no relevance to their actual job prospects. Three years after
graduation, only fifty-five percent of university law graduates
(and only thirty-seven percent of junior college graduates)
report employment "related" to their studies. Again, these are
the lowest figures for all fields of study surveyed.70
The flood of new law graduates is only one factor behind
rising unemployment and underemployment. The mismatch
between their skills and the actual demand for their services is
yet another. So, while numbers of new graduates have surged
over the past decade, some jobs go unfilled for a lack of
qualified personnel. Domestic and international firms struggle
to locate talent with the right mix of legal and language skills,
capable of operating in a fully international environment. Rural
courts in western China find themselves unable to attract
university graduates to fill gaping vacancies in their rosters.7'
Naturally, poor quality education also contributes to the
difficulty of graduates in finding jobs. Rapid expansion of legal
68. Ji Fei & Cui Qingxin, Woguo lushi duiwn renshu jin 20 wan ren [ Numbers of
Lawyers in China Approaches 200,000], XTNHUA, Nov. 23, 2010, available at
http://news.xinhuanct.com/lcgal/2010-11/23/c_12806164.htim; 2001 lushi, gongzheng,
tiaojie gongzuojiben qingkuang [2001 Basic Information About the Work of Lawyers, Notaries,
and Mediators], P.R.C. NATL BiUREFAU OF STATISTICS, http://vw.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/
2001c/v2204c.htn.
69. See Chart 3, infra note 76.
70. MYCos RESEARCH INST., 2012 ZHONGGUO DAXLESHENG JIUYE BAOGAO
[CHINESE COLLEGE GRADUATES EMPLOYMENT ANNUAL REPORT (2012)], 22021, this. 2-
2-22, 2-2-23.
71. Wang Chcnguang, Pengbo sanshi zai, zhanchi xiang weilai [ Thirty Years of Growth,
Spreading Our Wings and Looking to the Future], LEGAL DAILY (Scpt. 1, 2008),
http://newsjcrb.com/xwji/200809/t20080901_68080.html.
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education in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the overnight
proliferation of many programs where "everything from the
teachers and students to the training actually provided is of low
quality.72 Even among more highly ranked programs, much of
Chinese legal education remains characterized by an academic
and theoretical focus that does little to prepare students for
actual careers. As one lawyer put it, "I did an undergraduate,
masters, and Ph.D. degree in law here in China. All of it was
utterly worthless in terms of preparing me to actually work."7 3
These trends have prompted a reassessment of legal
education among students. For many, law has become less
attractive as a major. Beginning in 2005, law fell off of the list of
most highly desirable majors (chosen by the best performing
students on the national college entrance examination).?
Simply put: in 2000, law was hot. Now it's not.
Declining student interest and weaker job prospects,
however, have not immediately translated into significant
declines in the absolute number of Chinese students studying
law. Choice of major is not entirely in the hands of students.
Rather, Chinese universities face state-mandated college
entrance quotas for particular majors.75 And since many students
would rather attend any university program than none at all,
fields of study that are in little demand can still remain
completely filled by students for whom they serve as a "safety"
choice of last resort.
Nonetheless, changes are underway. Since the early 2000s,
Chinese authorities have begun to curtail the relative growth of
legal education.
Chart 3 illustrates this point in greater detail.1 It displays
the total number of Chinese students graduating with four-year
72. Sun, supra note 57, at 111.
73. Interview, in 1eijing, China (July 5, 2012).
74. Ranking ofMajors, supra note 55.
75. For cxaiplc, the 2011 quota charged the Northwest University of Politics and
Law ("NWUPL") with accepting 201 students from Shaanxi province to study
comincrcial law, 71 to study English, and 35 to study philosophy. See Xibei zhengfa daxue
2011 nian gaokao zhaoshengjihua zongbiao (zhuanyefangxiang) [Master Chart for the 2011
NTWUPL Student Recruitment Plan (Majors)], Nw. UNIV. OF POITICS & LAW (May 11,
2011), http://www.nwupl.cni/zhaosheng/bcnkc/zsjz/2011/05/11/2960.htmfl.
76. For an explanation of the data sources, see Chart 1, supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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university (benke) degrees in law from institutions of higher
education, compared with all university graduates [the latter
being divided by ten for the purpose of graphic illustration].
Chart 3
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Since the turn of the century, numbers of university law
graduates have grown rapidly along with the rest of higher
education. They also increased proportionally-reaching 5.7%
of all university graduates by 2003.77 But in recent years, Chinese
authorities have begun limiting the numbers of entering law
students.
As a result, although the total number of students in
institutes of higher education continues to grow, the percentage
of them studying law has declined.78 Out of 2.6 million university
graduates in 2010, 4.4% (114,588) received law degrees.79 This
77. Putong gaodeng xuexao fenke xueshengshu [2003 Number of Students by Field of
Study in Regular Higher Educational Jn s itutions], MINISTRY OF EDU C.,
http://wwN.ioc.edu.cn/publiefiles/business/ htmlfiles/moc/moe593/200507/
10487.htinl (last visited March 11, 2013). Law graduates reached 5.9% of all graduates
from institutes of higher education (including zhuanke students). Id.
78. See Chart 2, supra note 12 and accompanying tcxt (giving figures for graduates
of all institutions of higher education. including both university and junior college
students).
79. See Putong gaodeng xuexiaofenke xueshengshu [2010 Number of Students by Field of
Study in Regular Higher Educational Institutions], MINISTRY OF EDUC.,
http:,//vw.moe.edu.ci/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s6200)/201201/
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trend is set to continue. Law students represented 3.8% of
entering university students in 2010. They comprised only 2 .9 %
of all students entering institutions of higher education-half
the percentage set a decade earlier.80
In fact, even total numbers of law students may have hit an
inflection point. Since 2009, for the first time in decades,
absolute numbers of both Chinese university and junior college
law graduates have actually decreased on an annual basis.81
B. Degree Devaluation
The rapid increase in the number of Chinese law degrees
over the past fifteen years has severely eroded their value. When
relatively rare in the 1990s, undergraduate (or even junior
college) law degrees sufficed to get good jobs. Now a common
commodity, they no longer do.
As with currency, this has driven an inflationary spiral. As
massive expansion in the supply of one degree leads to a
devaluation in its worth, employers respond by demanding yet
higher degrees as entrance criteria. Students are driven to seek
such degrees to stay competitive.
Chart 4 illustrates these trends.82 It displays the number of
students entering (rather than graduating from) law programs
at institutes of higher education.
129594.htmi (last visited March 11, 2013). In 2010, law students comprised 3.4% of all
graduates (including both benke and zhuanke) from institutions of higher education. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Chart 1, supra note 12. Note. however, that there has been an uptick in
numbers of students admitted to university law programs in the past two years. See
Chart 4, infra note 82.
82. For an explanation of Lhe data sources, see supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
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Chart 4
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The overall number of students entering Chinese law
programs after secondary school has remained almost
unchanged since 2004. But there has been a sharp decline in
the numbers of students entering junior college programs. This
makes sense. Since 2001 legal reforms raised educational
requirements for all new judges, prosecutors, and lawyers to
university degrees, the value of junior college programs has
eroded in the eyes of the state and students alike."
A similar dynamic has taken place with regard to post-
graduate legal education. Chart 5 gives the data for two-
doctoral and the "academic" master's (LL.M.-Jaxue shuoshi)
programs.84
83. Liang Wenyong, Faxue dazhuan jiaoyu [Junior College Legal Education], in FAXUE
JIAOYU I)L ZHONGGUO MOSHI [MODAL OF LLGAL EDUCATION IN CHINA], 76, 78-79 (Ji
Xiangde ed., 2010).
84. Putong gaoxiao fenxueke ?anjiusheng sh  [ Graduate students in regular institutes of
higher education], MINiSTRY OF EDUC. (2012), http://www,.Ioc.cd.cn/publiefilcs/
business/htmlfiles/moe/moe 13 94/200703/20414.html.
358 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:334
Chart 5
Numbers of Entering Postgraduate Law Students
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Since the late 1990s, numbers of master's and Ph.D.
students in law have increased dramatically. In part, this reflects
the general expansion of higher education. But state authorities
also enlarged master's programs as a means to absorb growing
numbers of university law graduates unable to findjobs.85
This is a problem. It is a youth unemployment bulge
disguised as an increase in postgraduate education. Rather than
solving problems, it merely postpones them. Around 2003,
graduates holding master's degrees in law could walk into good
positions in urban courts or Beijing universitiesSn But rapid
proliferation of these degrees has led to their devaluation as well.
This has led to the emergence of media reports such as
"Graduate with Masters in Law Seeks Position as Cafeteria
Worker. "
85. See Ya .iusheng- "Paorno" wei hec ye chi ue da [ W h Grduate Suden
"Bble ' r Beng Bown Briger and Bige r, XINHUA DAILY I LCRaPH' (July 17, 2012),
http://edu. 163.com/ 12/ 0717/ /86KMEMR300293NU2.html
86. Interview, in Beijing. China une 13, 2011); Interview, in New York. United
States (Jan. 27, 2012).
87. Chen Hui, Faxiue suashi yingpin cantingfuwayuan [ Graduate with Mlasters Degree
in Law Seeks Position as Cafeteria Vorker] CITUTIAN JINBAO (May 14, 2012),
http://ctjb.cnhubei.com/htil/ctjb/20120514/ctjbl733469.html. The same dynamic
exists with regard to doctoral degrees. Beijing universities that once aggressively sought
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As a result of this spiral of degree devaluation, many
Chinese law students are willing to spend large sums of money
on advanced degrees to distinguish themselves from other
graduates. Enrollment in foreign LL.M. programs (with tuition
ranging up to US$50,000 a year) has surged. Chinese schools
have expanded their J.M. (falit shuoshi-or "professional" law
masters) programs, charging four times as much in tuition per
student as compared with the "academic" master's degrees.88
The Peking University School of Transnational Law has
recruited students seeking an English-language education in
American law (US$38,000 spread over four years), along with a
Chinese J.M. degree.,"
Of course, for many students, it is unclear whether the
benefit produced by these programs justifies their cost. As
Matthew Erie has noted, J.M. degree programs remain beset by
the same problems-rote memorization and a lack of focus on
practical skills-that limit the employability of domestic LL.M.
(or undergraduate law) graduates.o
Moreover, some of these programs are experiencing degree
devaluation as well. Take foreign LL.M. degrees. In the early
2000s, the cost-benefit analysis made rational economic sense-
the mere possession of a foreign degree from any American law
school rendered students competitive for positions at foreign
law firms in China. But as LL.M. degrees have proliferated, their
value has eroded in the eyes of both foreign and domestic firms.
As one lawyer in a top domestic Chinese firm noted, "An LL.M.,
domestic Ph.D.'s for legal teaching positions have now adopted explicit policies on only
hiring candidates holding overseas degrees. Interviews, in Beijing, China (Jun. 29,
2012).
88. Matthew S. Eric, Legal Education Reform in China Through U Inspired
Transplants, 59. LEAL EnC. 60, 75-76 n.51 (2009); Interviews with various Chinese
Law School Deans and Professors, in Kunming, China (Aug. 12, 2011). Launched in
1996, the J.M. was initially aimed at students who had not previously studied law as an
undergraduate degree. Modeled along the American J.D. degree, it was supposed to
prepare students for professional carcee r, in contrast to the academic and research
orientation of the domestic LL.M. degree. Eric, supra, at 67-68.
89. See Beijing daxue guoji faxueyan 2013 nian guoji adii shaoshi/J.D. (fei faxe)
zhaosheng jianzhang [Peking University School of Transnational Law, General Regulations on
2013 Student Recu itment for the International Master's of Law/J.D. (non-law
undergraduate )], PEKING UNIV. OF TRANSNAT'1 ILAw, § 7 (Sept. 2012),
http: //sl.pku.edu.cn /cn /ListDctail.aspx?Nod(c ode91 5006002&Id=
100000593821377.
90. Erie, supra note 88, at 70-72.
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by itself, does not mean that much-just about everyone has
one, and it is hard to sense the impact." In contrast, "if we see a
resume with a J.D. (somewhat rare), that person is given a very
hard look."9
Nor are foreign degrees alone in experiencing devaluation.
Characteristics of the J.M. program suggest that it is also at risk.
Chinese deans report that they are being guided to increase the
size of their J.M. programs. 92 But the short-term financial
incentives of schools in doing so are not aligned with long-term
employability of graduates. Further, many graduates from lower-
ranked institutions enroll in J.M. programs at higher-ranked
schools not because they have any interest in law at all, but
merely to obtain (at the cost of elevated tuition) any degree
from a more prestigious institution."
Of course, at some point, this cycle encounters limits.
Students decide that the economic return on a degree is not
worth the investment of time (or money). State authorities voice
concerns about educational quality. As a result of these trends,
deans report that they are being guided to reduce the size of
their (primarily state-funded) academic master's programs.94
Take the China University of Politics and Law, for example.
Numbers of students entering academic master's programs in
law surged from 394 (in 2003) to 755 (in 2009). But in the last
three years, these numbers have declined by twenty six percent,
reaching 556 in 2012.95 As Chart 5 indicates, this is a nationwide
trend.
Degree devaluation has also altered the dynamics within
universities. In the late twentieth century, degrees themselves
91. Personal coninunication from lawyer in doiCstic Chinese firn, June 18,
2012).
92. Since 2009, cducational authorities have allowed students With undergraduatc
degrees in law to enter J.M. prograns- the oretically expanding the numbers of
possible applicants. Interviews wvith various Chinese Law School Deans and Professors,
in Suzhou, China (June 23-24, 2012); Personal Communication fron Dean in Chinese
law school, (Oct. 14, 2012).
93. See Erie, supra note 88, at 74.
94. Interviews with various Chinese Law School Deans and Professors, in Suzhou.
China (June 23-24, 2012).
95. See lihujun 1981, 2012 Fada shuoshi thaosheng jinzhang chulai le faxe shuoshi
shaosheng renshu xiajiang jin 100 ren [2012 CUPL Admissions Data Released: Numbers of
Academic Masters Students Drop by 100], KAOYAN (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://bbs.kaoyan.con/t3910936p 1 (compiling data for the past eight years).
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were tickets to good jobs. The national college entrance
examination (gaokao) served the credentialing function for
employment purposes. Pass the exam, you entered college, and
you were guaranteed a good job upon graduation. Obviously,
this generated intense pressure on high school students
(making their lives a living nightmare studying for the exam).
But things were quite different once they successfully entered
university. Students and professors alike were free from the
pressure of needing to study for, or teach to, a specific exam.
This has changed. Degrees are no longer rare. Jobs are. As
a result, the employment credentialing function has partially
shifted away universities. This is particularly true in the wake of
the creation of the national judicial examination (in 2002) and
civil service examination (launched in 1994, regularized in
2002).96 Of course, it still matters whether applicants have
degrees from elite universities. But success on the judicial or
civil service examinations has increasingly emerged as a key
selling point for students entering the job market.
Law professors and students note that this has changed the
atmosphere of classes. This is particularly true since 2008, when
Chinese authorities began to allow law students who had
completed the third year of their university studies to sit for the
judicial examination. Students feel pressure to spend significant
time during their junior year preparing for the exam. A "cram
school" atmosphere has spread on some campuses.
Characteristics associated with Chinese high schools-rote
memorization for standardized tests, a lack of interest in
broader topics outside the exam material-are being imported
into university legal education. Further, because schools are
increasingly rated on their ability of their students to pass the
national judicial exam, some professors report increasing
96. Yuan Dingbo, Guojia sifa kaoshi yi li 10 jie, baogao renci chao 300 wan [ Tenth
Anniversary of the National judicial Examnation, Over Three Million Applicants], LLGAL
DAILY, July 25, 2012, available at http://ed.sitna.co.cn/zgks/2012-07-25/
0815350103.shtml. A limited experiment with Civil service examination was held by
several bureaus as early as 1989. By the early 2000s, the exam had become regularized,
attracting large numbers of applicants (over a million in 2011). fiyi: 1994 niar
zhongvang guojia jiguan shouci zhao kao gongtuyan [Flashback: In 1994, First Civil Service
Examination Held For Central Government Bureaus]. S. WLLKEND, Nov. 15. 2011. available
at http://edu.sina.com.cn/official/2011-11-15,/1711318309.shtml.
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pressure to adjust the content of their classes to teach to the
exam. 9
C. Institutional Distortion
Heavy use by central authorities of target-intensive, one-size-
fits-all evaluation mechanisms to develop higher education have
created severe institutional distortions.
First, they have encouraged massive overexpansion. Rapid
expansion of legal education has not been a carefully
considered response to actual student or social demand. Rather,
it has been part of ai arms race among schools competing for
central recognition as (for example) Project 211 or 985
institutions. The same is true for the physical facilities of schools.
As one vice-dean complains, "I try ordering quality publications
for the library, but the staff just cuts me off, telling me I don't
know what I'm doing if I want to make the targets for numbers
of books in the library."98
Second, they have pushed all schools to uniformly model
themselves as research institutions, regardless of whether this is
appropriate for their students and communities. Institutions
ranging from local teacher training schools to national research
universities find themselves driven to emphasize the same
priorities: increase the educational qualifications of your faculty;
generate large numbers of published articles.
Third, top-down evaluation mechanisms have led to an
intense focus on "making target" throughout higher education,
with highly negative consequences for educational and
academic quality. Universities farm out specific numerical
targets to individual schools (hire X number of Ph.D.'s this
year). Deans do the same to individual professors (produce Y
numbers of articles this year), linking success to salary and
promotion prospects."
This has resulted in ever-escalating competition to rack up
higher numbers. Since the late 1990s, schools have steadily
increased numerical requirements facing academics. Take
97. Interviews, in Xi'an, China (Aug. 7-8, 2011); Interviews, in Kunming, China
(Aug. 10, 2011).
98. Interview, in Kunming, China (Aug. 12 2011).
99. See id.; see also Interview, in Xi'an, China (Aug. 7, 2011).
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publications, for example. In the early 1990s, a single article or
two might have sufficed to permit an academic to ascend to full
professor status. Now, schools routinely require Chinese
academics to crank out multiple articles every year as they
ascend from lecturer to assistant professor to full professor, and
even afterwards. Ioo
As competition has intensified, new quantitative targets
have multiplied. For example, since the launch of the national
judicial examination in 2002, officials have increasingly made
pass rates of graduates an important factor in evaluating schools.
Since the early 2000s, schools have increasingly made success in
obtaining research grants (keti) issued by national or provincial-
level governments a requirement for academics to be promoted
from one rank to the next.1 01
One might ask-but, isn't this actually good? Competition
leads to greater production. And it generates a search for new
numerical standards for comparison.
But some targets are only loosely related to actual
education and research. As one Chinese law school dean fumed,
"Some of these things are thought up by outsiders [i.e.,
administrators who don't understand education]-if you apply
our evaluation standards, Japan doesn't have any top-ranked
universities." 102 Other targets (such as the physical size of
campus facilities) appear to be motivated by a desire for large-
scale projects that generate jobs or political achievements
(zhengji) that administrators can point to as tangible successes in
order to promote their own careers. Still others are driven by
the bureaucratic need for indicators capable of being
quantitatively measured (numbers of articles, numbers of
professors with Ph.D.'s), despite the poor fit between what is
being measured and the actual output desired (high quality
research and teaching). 103
100. See Interview, in New York, United States (Mar. 4, 2012).
101. See id. The rise of keti-numbers, funding, links to academic promotion-
might ofler an interesting opportunity to study the increased "administratification" of
academia in China over the past decade.
102. Interview, in Kunming, China (Aug. 10, 2011).
103. Such problems parallel those found in a wvide range of systems outside of
China as well. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis. Benedict Kingsbury, & Sally Engle Merry,
Introduction: Global Governance BT Indicators, in GOVLRNANCE By 1INDICATORS 3. 3-28
(Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012).
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Pressure to hit designated numerical targets has helped fuel
a widespread culture of academic corruption and junk research.
As one professor (and standing committee member in the
consultative chamber of China's national legislature) phrased it:
Because existing evaluation systems unilaterally emphasize
numbers of articles and length of manuscripts, researchers
produce huge amounts of scholarly garbage. Many works
are low-quality copies [of other works] or lack any
publication value, and have never been read or cited [by
anyone]. In order to get published in a given journal, some
authors and the organizations that employ them resort to a
range of dishonest measures. These include: dropping the
actual author of a work and convincing a famous individual
or international scholar to allow themselves to be listed as
the first author; using material and non-material incentives
to buy off an outside evaluator or editor of a journal, or
creating interest-based alliances [of scholars], that mutually
tout each other to advance, and cooperate to block
outsiders and dissenters.1 4
Schools deceive central evaluation teams with regard to
other targets. Administrators make side payments to academics
at other institutions, falsely report them as their own faculty, and
thereby raise their own statistics of advanced degree holders. 0
Some schools falsify employment statistics for their graduates.
Others condition issuance of diplomas on the ability of students
to present proof of post-graduation employment. This puts
students in a "Catch-22" situation. They themselves may need
proof of employment to obtain jobs. As a result, students are
pushed to falsify evidence of their own employment, thereby
allowing schools to report high employment rates.lo0
Markets have developed to capitalize on the economic
value associated with targets. In response to official systems that
evaluate articles (and the schools where the authors are
104. Ge Jianxiong, Xueshu fubai, xueshu shifan yu xuefeng buzheng. tanjiu u sikao
[Acadenic Corruption, Dishonesty, and Misdeed Research and Thoughts], in ANNUAL
RLPORT ON CHINA'S EDUCATION 123, 125 (Yang Dongping ed., 2010).
105. Seelntciview, in Shanghai, China (July 21 2011).
106. See Tan Renwei, Biyeshengfatie iexjia jiny zhniang bein-e ciheng wanglao
liuxing yu [Posting by Graduate Reveals Truth Behind False Employment Statistics, "To Be
Forcibl Employed" Becomes Internet Catchphrase], S. MLTROPOLIS DAILY, July 17, 2009,
availableathttp://finance.ifeng.com/topic/dxsjy/job/zcyw/20090717/951784.shtnl.
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employed) on citation counts, at least one school has developed
an internal reward system in which professors who cite articles
written by colleagues are paid fifty yuan per citation.107 Efforts
can be even more direct. In the spring of 2012, scandal rocked
the Hunan provincial education bureau when it was revealed
that officials had engaged in an extensive web of academic
corruption that included accepting payments (according to set
pricing schemes) in return for favorable target evaluations.108
Single-minded focus on making target has led to a pervasive
disregard for those components of higher education that are
difficult to measure quantitatively (such as actual quality of
academic articles) or are not heavily emphasized in the
evaluation process (such as teaching). Administrators and law
professors have little to no reason to ensure that education has
any real world relevance. Nor do they have any incentive to
devote any more than the most minimal amount of effort to
teaching. Many classes remain no more than warmed-over
recitations of statutory provisions, with a dose of abstract
Western legal theory thrown in for good measure. As one
former law dean notes, "The energy of the schools and
professors is no longer on actually teaching students, but rather
on obtaining government grants and writing articles. Education
is secondary."t o0
Last, as Chinese deans themselves note, the spread of top-
down target management systems has generated a dangerous
"administrification" (xingzhengiua) of higher education. 1 They
have led to a rapid influx of money and power that has imported
pervasive corruption and governance problems present
elsewhere in Chinese bureaucracy into higher education as
107. Interview No. 2, in Beijing, China (July 19, 2011).
108. Chen Ming, Gushou jiaoshou [Selling Professorships]. S. WFEKEND, May 10,
2012, available at http://wwW.inlfzm.co/content/75071.
109. Interview No. 3, in Beijing, China (July 19, 2011). Naturally, many of these
samne problems exist in American kgal education as well.
110. Se e.g. Gao XinI Faxue jauyg sijr [jigi oy LegEducatin Should Ibe
an Flite Education], I TE(GAu DAITY, Ay 17, 2012, t
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxjy/content/2012-05/17/content_3580552.htm
(presentmig comments tfrn Jiang Ping, former president (f China University of
Politics and Law); Qiu Chunyan, Jia Ya. Xingzhenghaa shi xueshu de tiandi, [ia Ya:
Adminisitrification is the Natural Enen of Scholarship], PROCURATORIAL DAILY, Nov. 19,
2007, available at http://wwwjcrb.com/nl/ jcrbl478/ca65 48 9 ?.hLtm (presenting
comments frornJia Yu, president of the Northwest University of Law and Politics).
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well.111 They have placed school administrators in the position of
regular supplicants vis--vis the Ministry of Education."2 This has
eroded the limited autonomy that schools have enjoyed since
the beginning of the reform period. Chinese academics suggest
that this has weakened their role as voices that speak truth to
power." 3
Chinese academics are very negative about these trends.
They perceive that this has resulted in a significant decline in
the quality of Chinese education since the late 1990s. "The
system itself creates moral problems." 14 "We've forgotten what a
university is.""
Is this to suggest that all of Chinese higher education is
junk? No. Many dedicated teachers remain committed to
improving the quality of education. Many young scholars are
conducting rigorous, careful research. But the environment
around them is toxic. Many in Chinese academia themselves are
highly cynical about the products of their own educational
enterprise. As one Chinese dean put it, "out of ten
law professors, one is great, two are OK, and seven are
unqualified." 16
D. The Turn Against Law
Last, recent years have seen a shift in political winds.
Starting in the early 2000s, central leaders began to reconsider
legal reforms they had launched in the 1980s and 1990s.17
Practically, Chinese authorities perceived that some
reforms, such as the 1990s-era emphasis on court adjudication
111. See generally F. Mliznr, Riots and Cover-ups: Counterprouive' Conrol of
Tocal Agents in China, 31 \. M.J.IN'1 I 5
112. Seeinterviews. in Shanghai, China (Aug. 16, 2011).
113. One notes that the need to curry favor to obtain government grants
"deprives you of your sense of pride" as a scholar. Interview, in Beijing, China (july 15,
2011). Others assert that oncrous paperwork and procedures associated with obtaining
such grants (combined with the limited utility they generate) are an effective tool for
state authorities "buy off the time of intellectuals" and prevent them from engaging in
political activism. Interviews, in Shanghai, China (June 1, 2012).
114. Interview, in Beijing, China (July 15, 2011).
I15. Interview, in Kunming, China (Aug. 12, 2011).
116. Interview, location withheld (June 5, 2011).
117. See Minzncr, supra note 6, at 948. Some language below is directly adapted
from the author's earlier article.
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and a professional judiciary, responded poorly to the needs of a
rural China lacking in legal talent. Politically, Party authorities
decided to rein in the judges, officials, and public interest
lawyers who had sought to deepen Chinese legal reforms as a
meaningful, institutionalized check on state power.""
Effects of this shift radiated outward. Substantively, Chinese
authorities deemphasized the role of formal law in dispute
resolution. Instead, they revived Maoist-era mediation
institutions. 19And starting in 2006, Party authorities launched
"Socialist Rule of Law" political campaigns that re-emphasized
Party supremacy and warned against the infiltration of
"Western" rule-of-law concepts.120
Authorities attempted to imprint legal education with their
new ideological line. Political-legal officials asserted that
"Socialist Rule of Law [must] 'enter schools, classrooms, and
minds.'"' 2' In 2007, they altered the national judicial exam to
include "socialist rule of law" as a major field on which students
are tested.12 In 2009, they published a textbook on the subject2.
and opened university classes on it in 2010.124
Such Party policies affected law schools. Central authorities
formalized alternatives to regular university law programs to fill
positions in local courts and governments. Beginning in 2008,
118. See id. at 947-48.
119. See id. at 945.
120. Luo Gan Qiushi fa wenzhang: Jiaqiang shehuizhuyi fazhi linian jiaoyu [Luo Gan
Publishes Article in "Seekirg Trth": Strengthen Socialist-Rule-of-Law Education], XINHUA,
June 15, 2006, available at http:/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-
06/15/content_4703143.htm. Such ideological efforts have become regular features
within Chinese courts and other institutions, reflected in materials for judges to review
in internal political study sessions. Minzncr, supra note 6, at 949-50.
121. Sun Chunying, Zhengfawei chutai shenru haizhan shehui zhuyifazhi linian jiaovu
yifian [Politics and Law Commitee Issues Opnion on Deepening Socialist Rule-ofLawi
Education], MINISTRY OF PUB. SEC., Feb 2, 2009, available at
http://w .gov.c/gzLdt/ 2009 -02 /09/content 1225477.htm.
122. Li Weiwei, Shehui thuyi fazhi linian naru 2007 niandu guojia sifa haoshi
[Socialist-Rule-of-Law to be Included in the Plan for the 2007 National Judicial Examination],
XINHUA, Aug. 25, 2007, available at http://mw.chinacourt.org/html/article/200708/
25/261688.shtml.
123. Shehui zhuyi fazhi linian duben' jianjie [A Brief Introduction to the "Reader on
Socialist Rule of Law], XINHUA, Apr. 19, 2010, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2010-04/19/c 1243383.htm.
124. Zhao Lei. 'Shehui zhuyifazhi jin jiaocai, jin ketang, jin naodai [ "Socialist Rule of
Law" to Enter Textbooks, Classrooms, Minds], S. WEEKLND, Nov. 11, 2009, available at
http://www.infzm.com/content/ 7227.
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they significantly expanded special legal training programs for
designated cohorts of demobilized military officers. Directly
funded by Party political-legal authorities, these programs are
particularly (but not exclusively) run out of the five politics and
law schools. Participants generally follow the same curriculum as
regular law students, but their educational experience differs in
key aspects. They are selected for their excellent service records,
are managed (and taught) separately from other students,
receive stronger ideological indoctrination, and adhere to
military discipline while enrolled. Upon graduation, they are
allocated to positions as judges and government officials in rural
China. In contrast to ordinary university graduates, authorities
perceive them to be more willing to take assignments in
impoverished areas, more politically reliable, less likely to leave,
and better capable of handling difficult rural disputes that
might require a broader range of skills than simply deciding
cases according to the law on the books.'
Of course, these policies are not without precedent. They
reflect a partial revival of practices dating back to the 1980s (and
1950s), when (in an era of limited legal talent) Chinese courts
were staffed almost entirely by ex-military officials. But they
represent a shift away from policies of the 1990s, which sought
to emphasize a regular university law education as the standard
career track for entering the Chinese judiciary.
In late 2011, clear signs emerged that Party political-legal
authorities sought to reshape legal education yet further to fit
their vision of the role of law in China.
In December 2011, Chinese authorities issued a joint
directive (discussed in more detail in the next section) creating
a new mechanism for rating and evaluating Chinese law
programs in institutions of higher education. It charges Party
political-legal authorities [in conjunction with the Ministry of
Education ("MOE") ] with carrying this out. This marks a
125. Interviews, New York, United States (Mar. 6, 2012); Interview, in Beijing,
China (July 1. 2012): Zhao Lei, Yi qun teshu de zhengfa xuesheng [A Group of Special
Political-Legal Students], S. WLLKEND, Feb. 12, 2009. available at
http://wwwf.infm.con/content/23625. Program participants totaled over 4,000 in
2008. Id. Future research might examine whether this is a useful experimein in
addressing rural governance, a part of the hardline efforLs to tighltn control over the
state apparatus in restive rural and ethnic areas of western China, or both.
CHINESE LEGAL EDUCATION
significant shift from earlier policies. Educational reforms of the
late 1990s and early 2000s had generally entrusted the MOE
with sole responsibility for educational programs.26 The 2011
plan reverses this, introducing Party political-legal authorities
directly in the process of evaluating and funding legal education
programs.'
New personnel were brought in to manage the China Law
Society ("CLS"), the national academic legal association. In late
2011, Chinese authorities designated a political-legal functionary
with deep experience in internal security affairs as the CLS Party
head.18 Few American readers are likely acquainted with the
bureaucratic intricacies of Chinese politics. But for the purposes
of a very rough comparison, perhaps try to picture the former
head of a clandestine joint task force responsible for
coordinating CIA, FBI, state, and local police responses in the
war on terror over the past decade. Now imagine him
subsequently named to head a state-run version of the
Association of American Law Schools and charged with
coordinating academic legal scholarship and exchanges. That is
what took place in China.
Last, along with these developments, there were a series of
speeches by top Chinese Party political-legal authorities and
editorials in the state media. These warned of the ideological
126. Guanyu tiaozheng guowuynan bumen (danwei) suo shu xuexiao guanli tizhi he buju
fiegon d shishi yifian [Implementing Opinion Regrding the Readustment oJ the Management
and Distribution of Schools Belonging to State Council Bureaus (and Work Units)], MINISTRY
oF EDUC., MINISTRY OF FIN. & NATL DL. & RLFORM COMM. (Jan. 29, 2000),
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000,/content60(667.htm. Turn of the
millennium reforins specifically withdrew the five politics and law schools froi the
control of the Ministry of Justice (which falls under the portfolio of Party political-legal
authorities) and placed them wvith other schools under the Ministry of Education
("MOE") and its local branches (which do not).Ji Xiangde, Faxuejiaoyu Zhongguo moshi
de chubu xingcheng [The Beginning of the Development of the Chinese Model of Legal
Edaaiton], in FAXUFJIAOYU DE ZHONGGUO MOSHI [MODAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN
CHINA] 34, (Ji Xiangde ed., 2010).
127. fiaoyu bu, zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui guanyu shishi zhuoyue fali rencai paoyu
peiyang jihua de ruogan yifian [Opinon of the Minstr of Education and the Central Polits
and Law Committee on Implementing the Program for Educating and Developing Outstanding
Legal Talent]. MINISTRY OF EDUC. & CLNT. POLITICS & LAW COMM., Dec. 23, 2011, art.
3(6) (on ille with the author).
128. Chenfiping ren zhongguo faxuehui dang shuji (tufjianli) [ChenfipingNaned Path
Sec eta, of China Law Society (Photo/CV)] . CONAtIST PARTY OF CHINA, Nov. 16, 2011.
available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/G/ 164113/ 16261541 .html.
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dangers posed by the infiltration of Western political, judicial,
and legal concepts.12 And they explicitly indicated a need to
politically reform legal education and academia in response.so
One of these is reproduced in Appendix 1 for some flavor.'
III. RESPONSE
Since fall 2011, Chinese authorities have begun
implementing long-term plans in response to many of the trends
discussed above.
Some are broad reforms aimed at addressing high
unemployment among all college graduates. Educational
authorities are encouraging them to consider alternative career
prospects (such as enlisting in the military or taking positions in
underdeveloped areas of western China). They are
strengthening practical skills training-ensuring that all
students in professional majors spend at least one semester in an
internship. They indicate that they will limit or close academic
129. See, e.g., Wei Lihua & Jiang Xu. Sifa shenpan zhong de renmin qinghuai Yu
qunzhong luxian [The Popular Mood and Mass Line in , dicial Trial Work], CHINA COUfRT
(June 22, 2011), http://old.chinacourt.org/html/article/201106/22,/455318.shtml
(warning of "a small nuinber of academic authorities and some media that have
departed from the [Chinese] national sentiment, and who excessively play with paper"
and "scholarly elites who seek to alter the thinking of Chinese judges with Western
legal concepts").
130. See, e.g., Fanrong shehui hyifazhi wenhua tuiin yi/a zhiguo [Allow Socialist Rule
of Law Culture to Prosper in Order to Promote Rule by Law]. M7YTZ, Dec. 28, 2011, available
at http://wwwmzyfz.com/ s/minzhuyufazlhishibao/fanftu/html/1248/2012-01-
05/content-261805.html (providing the speech of the deputy secretary of the Central
Party Politics and Law Conmittee, Wang Lequan, to the China Law Society). For those
interested in the nuances of Chinese political discourse on legal issues, note the
linguistic shift Wang makes in the speech (citing Zhou Yongkang, head of the Party
political-legal committee). Id. He calls for construction of a "system of discourse for
socialist rule of law" (shehui zhuy,ifazhi huayu tixi) covering the thought, theory, sources,
and language of every field of study in law. Id., § 1. That phrasing goes well beyond the
generic calls for Party supremacy and "socialist rule of law" seen in recent years.
Minzner. supra note 6, at 973.
131. Kou Guangping & Liu Dawei, Faxue jiaoyu yao qihe woguo defzzhifianshe [Legal
Education Must Accord With National Construction of the Rule of Law], LL(,. DAILY (Jan.
11, 2012). http://cpaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20120111 /Artice
112001(N.htm. The timing, content, language, and location of this op-ed, following
mere days after the issuance of the joint directive on lkgal education and speeches by
Party political-legal authorities on the sane subject, strongly suggest it was part of a
coordinated propaganda rollout.
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programs of study that fail to hit sixty percent employment rates
for two years in a row.132
Authorities are also reconsidering 1990s-era policies
supporting the growth of new comprehensive universities. In
late 2011, the Ministry of Education ("MOE") announced a halt
to the designation of new Project 211 and 985 institutions. I
Higher education is still set to grow. But national authorities
have indicated that their focus over the next ten years will be on
improving the quality of specific academic fields.134
Law is one area that has been singled out. On December
29, 2011, the Central Party Politics and Law Committee and
Ministry of Education released a joint opinion that will guide the
track of Chinese legal education over the next decade.13sa
The opinion identifies three major problems with Chinese
legal education: 1) a lack of diversity among existing law schools,
2) a lack of practical skills among law graduates, and 3) an
insufficient level of "socialist rule-of-law education."13 6
The opinion seeks to steer legal education in a new
direction. To accomplish this, it creates a new evaluation
mechanism. Just as with its predecessors (such as the 211 and
132. fiaoyu ba guanyu iohao 2012 nian quanguo putong gaodeng xuexio biye sheng
jiuwe songzuo de tongzhi [Notice of the Alinisty of Education Regarding Canying Out the
Employment toik fo 2012 Gr1 aduaefrs From Institates of Higher Education], MINTSTRY OF
EDn C., Nov. 10, 2011, v ailable at http:,// wy.rnoe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/
htmlfiles/moc/s3265/201111/126852.html. Authorities are also attempting to create
new mechanisms to combat fraud on the part of universities seeking to boost their
employment statistics. One such proposed measure: encouraging civil society
organizations (rather than the schools themselves) to collect relevant employment
data. Id.
133. fiaoyu bu: bu zai xinshe 211 he 985 gongcheng xuexiao [MOE: No New 211 and
985 Program Schools to be Designated]. XINHUA. Dec. 31. 2011, available at
http://edi.sina.con.cn/gaokao/2011-12-31/1140322608.shtnl.
134. Guojia zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangvao 2010-2020 [2010-
2020 National Educational Reform and Development Programme], XINHUA, July 29, 2010,
available at http:,// wy.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-07/29/content 1667143.htm. Goals include
raising the nuinber of students in institutions of higher education from 28 million in
2010 (a 24% enrollnent rate) to 33 million (40%). The number of graduate students is
set to increase frorn 1.4 to 2 million. Id.
135. fiaoyu bu zhongvang zhengfawei guanou shishi zhuoue fahi rencai peiang jihua
ruogan yijian [Rlevant Opinions of the Miistr of Education and Central (Party) Political-
Legal Committ e on Implemetting he Plat for Trainitg Outtanding Legal Talent], XINHUA,
Dec. 23. 2011, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/cdu/2012-
04/25/c_12302928.Lll [liereinafter XINHUA, Relevant Opinions].
136. Id. at 1-2.
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985 programs), it establishes a privileged designation (here,
"outstanding legal talent training program"). Institutions that
successfully distinguish themselves on a range of designated
criteria receive the designation, linked to additional state
resources and privileges.'1 Competition should push schools to
adjust their priorities in accordance with the new evaluation
targets. During the summer of 2012, law deans at schools across
China were indeed scrambling to position themselves in this
struggle.1
But the new plan differs from late 1990s-era evaluation
mechanisms in several important ways. Unlike the 211 and 985
designations, it is specifically directed at law programs, rather
than schools as a comprehensive whole. And designations of
"outstanding legal talent training" are to be made jointly under
the direction of education officials and Party political-legal
authorities, rather than the former alone.'13
Further, it does not list a single set of criteria as to what
constitutes an "outstanding legal talent training program."
Rather, it sets forth three different ones: 1) those that that are
generally focused on improving students' practical skills, 2)
those that train elite students to operate in the global economy,
and 3) those that train basic-level legal personnel for the courts
and government agencies of rural western China. The plan
allows all three types of programs to qualify. Some eighty
institutions are to be designated under the first category. Twenty
are to receive the designation for their work on globalized legal
education; twenty for their work on training rural cadres. 140
With regard to educational content, the plan seeks to
strengthen practical skills. Under the plan, fifteen percent of
credit hours must be devoted to practical or experiential
education. Clinical, moot court, and internship programs are to
be emphasized.' 4 '
The plan encourages two forms of increased cooperation:
between 1) Chinese and foreign law schools and 2) between
Chinese law schools and PRC government institutions. Under
137. Id. at 6-8.
138. Interviews, in Suzhou, China (June 23-24, 2012).
139. See XINHUA, Relevant Opinions, supra note 135.
140. Id. at 2-3, 5.
141. Id. at 4.
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the former, Chinese law programs are encouraged to develop
exchange and joint degree programs with elite foreign schools.
With regard to the latter, the plan lists a range of specific
programs to be launched. One hundred educational training
centers are to be established and jointly operated by schools and
relevant government bureaus. Personnel are to be shared. One
thousand law professors are to be rotated into the government
for one- to two-year long stints, in order to obtain practical work
experience. A similar number of government cadres are to be
rotated into academic legal posts.'14
Last, the plan explicitly aims at introducing a greater
degree of political content into Chinese legal education. It
directs schools to organize the editing of teaching materials
grounded in "Socialist Rule-of-Law with Chinese
Characteristics." 143 However, the opinion does also call for
"selectively" and "with discrimination" importing high-quality
foreign legal materials.144
Interviews with Chinese law school deans and professors
flesh out the extent to which this program reflects a confluence
of different institutional interests.
First, it is an effort to trim the some six hundred legal
education programs in China, many of low quality and with poor
employment statistics. Programs not designated as "outstanding
talent training sites" will be gradually marginalized via both
market pressures (employers preferring to hire graduates from
designated schools) and administrative ones (educational
authorities granting designated schools more resources, higher
student quotas, and preferential access to post-graduate
programs). Elite national universities should prosper, as will the
politics and law schools. But many law programs in lower-tier
institutions will likely be curtailed.'4 5
Second, the new plan attempts to steer Chinese legal
education in a more practical, skills-based direction. The
emphasis on clinics, the emphasis on experiential education-
these reflect a pervasive concern that legal education has
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Inrcvriw, in Suzhou, China (Junc 23, 2012); InLerview, in Shanghai, China
June 29, 2012); Interview, in Beijing, China uly 1, 2012).
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become too academic, too divorced from reality, and of little
actual utility to students or society. Naturally, these moves are an
outgrowth of reform efforts pursued over the past decade by
different Chinese law schools.' 4 For example, the reference to
heightened faculty-government exchanges resembles policies
launched at the Northwest University of Politics and Law
("NWUPU). Since 2008, NWUPL has implemented mandatory
six-month internships in government for master's students,
requirements for young professors that they must serve in the
courts or procuratorate for at least a year as a condition of being
promoted, and job exchange programs between senior judges
and professors.147
Third, the plan also reflects a bureaucratic duel between
China's five traditional politics and law schools and the elite
comprehensive universities. Deans and faculty at the former
sensed that their institutes had been eclipsed as a result of late
1990s educational reforms. Previously, the politics and law
schools had enjoyed a privileged standing as the designated
training ground for state cadres in courts, procuratorate, and
other legal institutions. As state-allocated employment faded, so
did this role. Further, the politics and law schools found
themselves increasingly unable to compete for privileges under
the MOE-managed 211 and 985 programs, which steered
resources to comprehensive, rather than specialist, schools.148
Fearing marginalization, the politics and law schools
engaged in aggressive lobbying of central authorities during the
drafting of the new "outstanding talent" plan. In 2010, the five
schools joined together to form the "Legal Alliance" (lige
lianmeng). 14 The Alliance aims to increase academic exchanges
146. Interview, in Beijing, China (July 6, 2012). Both clinical and experiential
education progranis have been the focus of extensive multi-year domestic and
international cooperative education efforts.
147. Interviews, Xi'an, China (Aug. 7-8, 2011). Success has been mixed. Students
complain about difficult living conditions in internship placements at imore remote
courts, and it has been difficult to recruit more senior professors and judges to rotate
jobs. But some young professors report it has been a usefi and eye-opening
experience to serve for a year as a judge on a local court. Id.
148. Interview, in Shanghai, China (Aug. 16, 2011).
149. Tai Jianlin, Quanu zhengfa daue ige lamg die gackng luntan j
[ "Legal Alliance" of Naion' Politics and La Univities Holds Second Summit Discussonl
LECAL DAILY, July 1.3) 2011, av/ailble at htp/wgidaily com1cn/fxy/content/
c011-07/13/contet_2791881.htm
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and cooperation between the schools. But it also has another
goal: to ensure that any targets set under the new central
evaluation process (and the resulting allocation of resources)
work to their advantage vis-A1-vis the elite comprehensive
universities.' This is part of the reason behind the shift away
from a unitary evaluation system and the return to a focus on
training state legal cadres-both of which benefit the politics
and law schools.
Last, Chinese deans confirm that different central actors
have had a hand in shaping the plan. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs ("MOFA") is one. During the drafting of the new plan,
MOFA reportedly drew attention to the limited level of Chinese
representation in the staff of multilateral institutions responsible
for drafting international treaties and regulations. The focus on
training global legal talent is partly aimed at addressing this.'"5
Party political-legal authorities have also been involved.
They supervise the work of the courts, procuratorates, police,
and security agencies. They are responsible for handling
challenges posed by a rising tide of citizen petitions and
protests. They are concerned with the numbers and quality of
government and court personnel in western China. This has
played into the decision to train rural cadres. They are also
ideologically opposed to the spread of Western rule-of-law
norms. This has motivated the new political stance towards legal
education.1 2
150. Interview, in Shanghai, China (Aug. 16, 2011). These efforts appear to have
been successful. In November 2012, state authorities announced the first batch of
schools selected as "outstanding legal talent training programs." Each of the five
politics and law schools was selected. Moreover, each was selected three times, as a
practical skills program, as a global talent program, and as program for training basic-
level legal personnel. 'While a handful of elite national universities (Peking, Renniin,
Qinghua) were designated under both the first two categories, no school (save the five
politics and law schools) was designated under all three. fiaoyu bu ban'gongting,
Zhongvang zhengfa weiuanhui ban'gongshi guanu gongbu shoupi zhnoyuefalii rencaijiaoyu
peiyang jidi mingdan de tongzhi [Notice f the OJfice of the Ministy ofEducation and Central
(Party) Political-Legal Committee on Announcing the Names of the First Group of Centers for
Training Outstanding Legal Talent], MINISTRY OF' EDUC. & CLNT. (PARTY) POLITICAl-
LEGAL COMM., Nov. 23, 2012.
151. Interview, in Beijing, China, (July 6, 2012).
152. Interviews in Suzhou, China (June 23-24. 2012): Interview in Beijing. China.
(July 1, 2012).
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IV. ANAL YSIS
A. The Chinese Legal Education Bubble Deflates
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, China
experienced a rapid, but ultimately unsustainable, expansion of
legal education.
Superficially, this parallels developments elsewhere. Take
Japan. In the early 2000s, reformers attempted to rapidly shift
legal education from an undergraduate model to a graduate
one. Numbers of law schools and students expanded
significantly. Poor job prospects among law graduates have
resulted in declining numbers of applicants, however. Many now
regard these reforms as a failure.1"
Latin America is another example. In the 1960s and 1970s,
law-and-development proponents sought to transplant legal
educational models taken from the United States as a tool to
push for system-wide change. But these efforts meshed poorly
with local conditions and were eventually abandoned.1 4
Or look at America. The United States faces a law school
tuition bubble. Since the 1980s, tuition has risen dramatically-
an astounding 150-400% in constant (inflation-adjusted)
dollars. 155 Regulatory capture is a driving factor. As Brian
Tamanaha has detailed, as the American Association of Law
Schools ("AALS") consolidated control over the regulatory
process for law schools during the twentieth century, it used this
power to increase the cost of legal education higher. Graduation
from AALS-accredited schools was made a requirement for
153. See Shigenori Matsui. Turbulence Ahead: The Future of Law Schools in Japan, 62
LEGAL EUnC. 3, 23-28 (2012); Miki Tanikawva, AJapanee LegalExan That Sets the Bar
High, N.Y. TIiES, July 10, 2011, av ailable at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/ll/
world/asia/1 iht -educLede 11. htmLi.
154. See generally David Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Developnent Asistne: Past,
Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW/v AND ECONOMIC DEVELI OPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
155. Costs at public law schools have increased at a much higher rate than private
institutions. For noninal (non-inflation adjusted) figures for tuition and fees, see AM.
BARAss'.N, LAw SCHOOL TuITION 1985-2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/ dam /aba/ administrative /legal education and admissions to the_bar/ statist
ics/1s_tuition.authcheckdaim.pdf. Increases have significantly outpaced those in
undergraduate education. David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 2011, at Bli.
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taking the bar exam in many states. Lower-cost educational
competitors, such as night schools, were forced to close or
change form to receive AALS accreditation. One-size-fits-all
accreditation standards were employed to force almost all
American law schools, ranging from elite private institutions to
local state schools, to pursue the same development track-
more tenured faculty, lighter teaching loads, heavier emphasis
on research and writing of academic articles, and expensive
investments in library facilities.156
All of the above were paid for by steadily increasing student
tuition. This was financed by easy access to government-backed
loans. Currently, eighty-five percent of US law graduates (at
accredited law schools) borrow money to finance their
education, graduating with an average of one hundred thousand
dollars in debt.'17 These debt numbers have skyrocketed in the
last two decades as tuition has risen.
The American law school tuition bubble is thus a consumer
credit-fueled one. Massive price increases have been facilitated
by continued access to submarket interest rates. This resembles
the early twenty-first century bubble in the US housing market.
This dynamic was relatively stable as long as law graduates
could obtain jobs to pay back their loans, and as long as popular
perceptions existed that law school was a good investment.
These are no longer true. Outsourcing and technology have
fundamentally shifted the market for lawyers. Nine months after
graduation, only fifty-five percent of the class of 2011 had
obtained full-time, long-term legal jobs.'" Even among those,
only a small proportion is high-paying jobs with big law firms
156. See TAMAINAHA, supra note 1, at 11-68, 126-34.
157. William Henderson & Rachel Zahorsky, The Law School Babble: How Long 1Will
it Last if Law Grads Can't Pay Bills?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 2012, available at
http://www.abajournal.coinL/nagazine/article/thclawischool-bubbleihowlong-will
it last if law grads cant pay bills. These aggregate figures include both public and
private institutions. Average debt at the most expensive private American law schools
ranges as high as US$150,000 for 2011 graduates. Debra Weiss, Average Debt of Private
Law School grads is $125K; It's Highest at These Five Schools, A.B.A. J., Mar. 28, 2012,
available at http://www.abajouirnal.coi/news/artick/averagcdcbtload of private
law-grads-is 125k thesc five schools lead to m.
158. Debra Weiss, Only 55 Percent oJ 2011 Law Grads Had Full-Time, Long-Term
Legal Jobs, Analysis Shows, A.B.A. J.. June 19, 2012, available at
http://www.abajournal.coi/news/article/only_55_perceitIof_2011 1aw grads had f
ull-time long-termlegal-jobs analys.
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that enable graduates to easily repay their loans. Given this, law
school is no longer perceived as a rational economic decision
for many students5"' Unsurprisingly, law school applicants have
plunged by thirty-eight percent since 2010.1 0
Despite some similarities, China differs from these
countries. Unlike Latin America, China's educational problems
are not the result of naive foreign development experts and
agencies promoting educational models at odds with national
needs. Unlike Japan, China's difficulties do not stem from
entrenched resistance from the bar to changes in legal
education.'Ib Rather, top Chinese authorities themselves pushed
through 1990s-era reforms. And they did so despite complaints
from the bar that the massive increase in law graduates was
detrimental to the interests of existing lawyers and the quality of
the legal profession.
China also differs from the United States. China does not
face a credit-driven student tuition bubble. University tuition has
increased in recent years. But the massive expansion in legal
education over the past fifteen years has primarily been paid for
out of state coffers. Chinese law graduates may feel that they
have wasted several years of their lives in public education that
inadequately prepares them for the job market. But at least they
159. TAMA NAHA, supra note 1, at 145-66.
160. Ethan Bronner, Law School's Applications Fall as Costs Rise andJobs Are Cut, N.Y.
TIMES, jan. 30, 2013, available at http:/./vww.nytimes.com./2013/01/3 I /education/law-
schools-applicatLions-fall-as-costs-rise-and jobs-are-cutihtil
161. In Japan, efforts to create a new, expensive system of graduate legal
education collapsed aftier judicial authorities (under pressure from the bar) refused to
raise the pass rate on the bar exam, undermining the value of student investment in
the new degrees and leading to a decrease in the number of graduate law school
applicants. See generally Matsui, supra note 153: Mayumni Sacgusa, Why the Japanese Law
School System Was Established: Co-optation as a Defensive Tactic in the Face of Global Pressures,
34 LAW & Soc. INQ IRY 365 (2009). The opposite has occurred in China. China has
raised the pass rate for the national judicial examination from under seven percent (in
2003) to over twent-seven p tcent (in 2008). Chen Qingqing, Sifa kaoshi tongguo lii
chao 20%, bei hhanjinliang jin[gdi Pass Rates fT National Judicial Exam Exceed 20%,
Result in Claims That Their Value Has Declined], GUANGZHOU DAILY, Sept. 18, 2011,
available at http://cdu.people.coim.cn/GB/15686176.htmil. In part, this is result of
pressure from judicial authorities seeking to make it easier for judges to pass the exam.
Dai Lang, Xibu sifa kaoshi tongguo lei tigao huanjie faguan huang wenti [Pass Rates for
Nationalfudicial Examination Raised in Western China, Alleviates Problem of Lack ofJudges],
SICHUAN NEWS,.jan. 5, 2010, available athttp://cd.qq.con/a/20100105/003997.htm.
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do not face the crushing debt levels that their American
counterparts do.
Nor is China primarily a story of regulatory capture. True,
as in the United States, one-size-fits-all evaluation models have
driven schools to uniformly pursue a research-oriented
educational model instead of a more diverse range of
approaches that might better respond to social needs. However,
this is not the result of capture of the accreditation process by
autonomous interest groups.
Rather, China's problems are the result of a state-led crash
program to rapidly expand university education since the late
1990s. State targets have pushed schools to model themselves as
research institutions. State funding has driven the massive
expansion of law faculties and large-scale production of low-
quality academic publications. And state quotas have guaranteed
continuing student enrollment in law programs,
notwithstanding poor employment results for graduates.
How is this possible? China is the greatest economic boom
story in history. In just a few short decades, it has shaken off
absolute poverty and emerged as the second-largest economy in
the world. In part, this has been facilitated by long-term
investments ranging from primary education to highway
construction. Why would state authorities develop higher
education in a manner with such negative consequences?
There are several answers. First-a desire for political
accomplishments (zhengji) at all levels. Central leaders wanted
signature projects (100 world-class universities for the twenty-
first century!) that they could tout as their achievements.
Ministry of Education and provincial authorities sought specific
accomplishments (thirty percent increase in numbers of
university students!) that they could point to in their struggle to
advance within the bureaucracy. At all levels, this supported the
emergence of a "Great Leap Forward" vision of educational
development, characterized by rapid growth and immediate
successes.
Second, to support this growth, Chinese authorities
imported problematic management practices used elsewhere in
government-namely, target responsibility systems linked to
high value rewards. Law schools and professors found
themselves pushed toward hitting specific numerical targets set
2013] 379
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from above, regardless of whether these bore any relationship to
the actual demands of society or the goals of education.
Third, Chinese administrators and academics sought to
directly import foreign models in building their legal
educational system. Establishment of law as a separate discipline;
emphasis on legal education as best provided in a university (or
graduate) setting; heavy focus on academic research and
publications; and the actual content of legal education-all of
these strongly borrowed from foreign (and particularly
American) models. This was understandable. In the 1980s, when
Chinese authorities began to rebuild their legal educational
system, they were working out of the rubble of institutions
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. They quite naturally
sought to replicate elements of what they saw as more developed
models. This was the case even if these models led to practical
disconnects in the Chinese system (a flood of university-trained
educated law students, but vacancies in rural courts) or political
disconnects (such as Western-oriented legal academics
emerging as critics of the political system).
Such practices-particularly the first two-are not unique
to higher education. They strongly resemble practices in China's
construction sector: elevated central targets for economic
growth coupled with massive state funding for construction
projects. These have pushed local authorities to engage in rapid
(but uneconomical) infrastructure expansion and
development.'6
As a result, the problems facing China and the United
States are both similar and different. America is experiencing a
credit-fueled law school tuition bubble-one very similar to the
early twenty-first century bubble in the US housing market.
China is facing a state investment-fueled legal education
bubble-one that parallels the current bubble in its
construction sector.
Because China's bubble is not driven by consumer credit, it
remains immune so far to pressures that are building in other
countries. Unlike the United States (or Japan), seats in Chinese
162. Michael Pettis, China's Explosive Debt Growth Can't Continue Much Longer, BLS.
INSIDLR, Jan. 23, 2012, available at IIp://arLicles.businessinsidcer.coi/2012-01-
24/markets/30658033 1 infrastructure-projects-capital-requirement-urban-rail.
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law schools remain full, driven by the prestige of obtaining
university or master's degrees and quota systems that allocate
students to law programs. Administrators and faculty remain
relatively insulated from the need to deal with the employment
problems facing their graduates. The kinds of market-based
pressures for change that are starting to force American law
schools to rethink educational models (as prospective applicants
opt out of studying law) simply do not exist.
But Chinese legal education does depend on a key factor
for continued growth: state support. This now appears to be in
question. Authorities believe that existing educational models
have not produced the desired returns on their investments. As
a result, a new period of retrenchment appears to be on the
horizon.
Of course, this is not without historical precedent. The
People's Republic of China has already experienced major waves
of change (both in the 1950s and the 1960s), in which the state
reconsidered the role that law and legal professionals should
play in society, and reduced support for legal education as a
result. As Glenn Tiffert has demonstrated, similar cycles of
expansion and contraction also characterized early twentieth
century Republican China. State authorities voiced concerns
regarding the excessive expansion of legal education, the quality
of graduates produced, their job prospects, and their political
reliability. In both the 1910s and 1930s, this led authorities to
enact sweeping legal educational reforms. They tightened
school licensing standards; capped or reduced numbers of law
students; and revised educational curricula in accordance with
prevailing political winds.16
B. The New(?) Track of Chinese Legal Education
As the late twentieth century legal education bubble
deflates, Chinese state authorities are reviving earlier
educational patterns dating back to the 1980s, or even the 1950s.
Take the decline of relative footprint of the study of law, for
example. As the charts in Part 1 indicate, it is the massive
163. Glenn Tiffert, Courting Revolution: The Beijing Municipal People's Court
and the Birth of the PRC Judicial System (1949-58) (forthcoming dissertation 2013,
University of California, Berkeley).
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increase in law students in the last fifteen years (rising to six
percent of all graduates by the early 2000s) that is an outlier. In
contrast, for much of the 1950s and 1980s, these numbers
hovered around two percent. Numerically, the current decline is
a reversion back toward these earlier levels.
The same is true for efforts to encourage diversification
among law programs. In both the 1950s and 1980s, a wide range
of institutions-universities, junior colleges, technical schools,
and short-term training programs-provided a variety of
different legal educational tracks. Only after the mid-1990s did
legal education become relatively standardized on a uniform
university model. Current efforts to push schools to differentiate
themselves-some training globalized legal talent, others
training local cadres-harken back to these earlier patterns.
Tighter links between government and legal education are
yet a third example. Revival of the politics and law schools;
strengthened links between law schools and government
bureaus, training ex-military officers to serve as local legal
cadres-all these represent a return of earlier trends that had
gone into eclipse since the 1990s.
Such developments suggest a need to nuance our
understanding of legal education in China. Not only will it not
grow at the same rate as in the past, it may actually be less likely
to resemble foreign educational models over time. 164 Instead, it
may be reverting back to yet earlier patterns taken from its own
history.
Here, a disclaimer is in order. Does this Article suggest that
China needs less law, fewer lawyers, and reduced levels of legal
education? That this somehow is keeping with a more
"authentic" Chinese version of legal education?
No. This Article simply argues that many of the problems
confronting Chinese legal education are the result of a
disconnect between the specific development track that state
authorities have pursued since the late 1990s (Everyone! More
students! Higher degrees! More articles!) and actual market
demands and social needs. Take a specific example. For rural
164. For an argument that Chinese legal education will increasingly assimilate
features taken from the United States, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Ka)ty-Wah Chan & 11hyung
Lee, The Refora of Legal Education in East Asia, 4 ANN. RLv. L. & Soc. SCi. 333, 334
(2008).
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China, the shift away from vocational and short-term legal
educational programs in the 1990s may have been a mistake.165
China may require fewer master's and Ph.D. candidates versed
in the latest legal theories, and more rural legal
paraprofessionals capable of handling citizen grievances. Of
course, the same may be true for the United States as well.
The effect of existing state plans to rework legal education
remains unclear. It is not clear whether Chinese authorities can
succeed in implementing their reforms. Many individuals and
institutions have vested interests in the existing system.
Universities resist shifts that might alter their rankings relative to
other schools. Professors hired for their research resist
redefining legal education as practical employment training.
Such groups agitate against dramatic reforms. Some express
doubts that educational authorities will be able to close weaker
law programs outright, or even significantly reduce the flow of
students into them.16
Nor is it clear that current plans will have positive results.
Official efforts to build "outstanding legal talent training
programs" appear aimed at allowing some schools to flourish,
and others to die on the vine. They do so by creating new top-
down target evaluation mechanisms around which competition
with revolve. These may just replicate existing problems in
different form. Sure, schools may no longer be incentivized to
pump out large numbers of low-quality academic publications in
order to be designated as elite academic institutions by
educational authorities. But instead, they may simply be
incentivized to pump out large numbers of students into low-
quality government internships in order to be designated as elite
professional institutions by political-legal authorities.
Key questions about the role of legal education also remain
unanswered. Of what use is the study of law in an authoritarian
regime that remains deeply conflicted about the role that formal
law, courts, and judges should play? Does legal education and
research have any independent value, or are university degrees,
165. Parallel problems exist with regard to 1990s-cra efforts at professionalizing
rural legal services. See, e.g., FU HUALING, AWAY FROM GRASS-ROO )s? THE IRONY OF
RLRA-L LL(,AL SERVICLS IN CHINA (May 20, 2012), available at http://papcrs.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=2063115.
166. Interview Nos. 2 & 3, in Beijing, China (july 19, 2011).
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academic articles, and research grants merely perfunctory boxes
for intellectuals to check off as they search to rise toward
leadership positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy?
Despite these criticisms, current Chinese state moves are a
partial effort to address latent problems in legal education.
Officials are curtailing growth in the numbers of the students
most at risk of unemployment. They have halted state programs
aimed at generating more four-year universities. They are
emphasizing more practical skills-based education. They have
also set out long-term plans to promote the diversification of
Chinese law programs. These are not purely political moves.
Some are serious efforts to deal with underlying structural
problems-oversupply and unemployment of law graduates,
misaligned incentives for schools and faculty-that have direct
parallels in American legal education.
C. Party Repoliticization of Legal Academia?
Despite the caveats advanced above, it is also important to
recognize that there has been an overtly political cast to legal
educational reforms pursued by state authorities-at least
through 2012.
As of spring 2012, Party political-legal authorities appeared
to have gained a greater voice in legal education.167 This is
167. In particular, the central Party conference held in fall 2011 may have
witnessed an agreement among top leaders to permit political-legal authorities greater
leeway to push their policies in the educational realm. At the conclusion of that
conference, central lcaders issued a top-level policy statement (guiding the work of all
Party organs) on reinvigorating Chinese culture. Zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi
gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [Central (Party) Decision on Several IAportant
Questions ofDeepening Reform in Culturaln hstitutions], XNHUA, Oct. 18. 2011, available at
http://www.gov.cin/j/rzg/20 11-1025 content 1978202.htm. One component: fighting
moral decay by promoting socialist rule of law (the political line that has emanated
from the Party political-legal organs in recent years) in the schools. In the following
eight weeks: 1) the Ministry of Education ('MOE') issued a five-year propaganda plan
for 2010-15 calling for extensive propaganda of socialist-rule-of-law concepts in
elementary and secondary education, and for making socialist-rule-of-law a component
of college entrance examinations, see Jiaoyu ba guanyu yinfa quanguo fiaoyu xitong
kaizhan fazhi xuanchuan jiaoyu de di lin ge wu nian jihua (2011-2015) de tongzhi [MOE
Naotice on Launching the Sixth Five Year Plan (2011-2015) of Legal Propaganda in the
Educational Syste], MINISTRY OF EDIU C. (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.moe.edu.cn/
publicfiles/busincss/htilfilcs/ moc/s5914/201111 /126492.htmil, 2) the MOE and
Party political-legal authorities jointly issued their ten-year reform plan for legal
education, 3) new personnel were brought in to manage the China Law Society, and 4)
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significant. Party political-legal committees are responsible for
overseeing efforts to maintain social stability and silence
domestic dissent. They are directly responsible for the
increasingly hard-line domestic policies pursued since 2005.
These range from aggressive harassment of rights lawyers,
increased resort to illegal detention of domestic activists, and
tighter political controls over courts.168
In contrast, since the beginning of the reform era, Chinese
legal academia has been deeply linked with liberal reform. Many
law professors have spent time abroad. Western institutional and
political models have influenced academic writing and research.
When Party authorities adopted "rule by law" (yfat zhiguo) as a
political plank in 1997, many law professors saw this as a green
light to engage in more active efforts to push institutional
reform. The early vears of the twenty-first century witnessed a
flourishing of public interest activity by lawyers and law
professors, fusing legal challenges, savvy media strategies, and
social mobilization to challenge abuses committed by local
authorities. 16
If Party political-legal authorities wanted to force a political
retrenchment within legal education, how might they do so?
Here's one hypothetical possibility. Imagine that the 2009
textbook on socialist rule-of-law and official denunciations of
"Western" rule-of-law influence are precursors to more
significant moves. In the coming years, educational and Party
political-legal authorities collaborate to issue sanitized versions
of criminal procedure and administrative law textbooks. Law
professors are required to use these in class. Relevant content of
the national judicial examination is harmonized with these
textbooks. This aligns the incentives of students seeking
employment with those of Party propaganda authorities. Efforts
by professors to supplement mandatory texts with additional,
top Party political-legal authorities began issuing politicized broadsides on the need to
rectilv legal education.
168. Carl Minzner, China (Country Report), in COuNTRILS AT THL CROSSROADS
2011: A SURVEY OF DEMOCRATiC GOVERNANCE 129, 142-43 (Jake Dizard, Christopher
Walker, & Vanessa Tucker eds., 2011).
169. See, e.g., Keith . Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang
Incident and Evolving Foris of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China, 45 COLUM.J.
TRANSNAT'L 1. I 114 (2006).
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outside materials is increasingly met with bored stares ("Is this
really going to be on the exam?").
At the same time, Chinese authorities tighten controls over
academics and schools. Salaries and career advancement are
even more closely wrapped around the willingness of academics
to produce articles that hew to the politically approved central
line. Evaluation mechanisms that designate "outstanding legal
talent training programs" give Party political-legal authorities
new channels to voice their approval as to the internal conduct
of particular institutions. Some law deans, seeking central
funding in an environment where money available for legal
education is in relative decline, enter into a pre-emptive crouch
and begin to apply a range of soft pressure on teachers and
academics to tone down their activities. Of course, some older,
more outspoken law professors simply ignore such pressure. But
younger legal academics, concerned with career pressures and
the need to pay for their housing and children's education,
compromise their activities to varying degrees, fall in line with
central mandates.
Fortunately, this scenario remains consigned to the realm
of imagination so far. Many liberal scholars, while scathingly
critical of the conservative direction that Chinese authorities
have steered the courts, remain confident that such pressures
will not significantly affect higher education. Some assert that
Party political-legal authorities will limit their efforts to
coordinating the work of schools and government to increase
the practical nature of legal education.170 Others argue that the
spirit of liberal reform is too deeply entrenched in Chinese
academia, that the concept of socialist-rule-of-law is intellectually
bankrupt, and that central leaders are unwilling to undertake
higher education reforms that might result in personnel cuts
and social protest by laid-off faculty members.' 7 1 Still others state
that schools will only nominally comply with whatever political
requirements Party authorities ordain, depriving them of any
real impact. 172
170. Interview, in Shanghai, China (June 29, 2012).
171. Interview, in Beijing, China (June 30, 2011).
172. Interview, in Beijing, China Quly 1, 2012).
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But some voice concerns. One vice-dean suggests that if
central authorities do mandate the use of politically approved
textbooks, "this would be a real problem-one difficult for us to
avoid in practice, and with a real impact on education."' 7 A
professor notes:
At the moment, efforts by conserv ative elements in the
China Law Society just irritate many professors. You can
always find ways to write what you actually want in a manner
to appear to be mouthing the slogans that they want you to
include, thereby satisfying some demand in the relevant
grant that you are supposed to be carrying out. But you lose
some of your self-respect in the process of doing that. That's
their goal-just to show you who is on top. If they continue
these efforts long-term, it will become a real problem. 7 4
But rapidly shifting elite Chinese politics now cast doubt on
whether these efforts to re-politicize legal education will actually
be continued into the future.
In the spring and summer of 2012, internal power struggles
bitterly divided top Party leaders. These resulted in the
spectacular fall from grace of sitting Politburo member Bo Xilai,
following a murder-and-corruption scandal involving his wife
and top aides.'17 Rumors spread that Zhou Yongkang, chairman
of the central Party Political-Legal Committee, had fallen out of
favor with other top leaders as a result of his support for Bo.176
And in the wake of the once-in-a-decade Party leadership
transition in the fall of 2012, central authorities appear to have
taken tentative steps to cut back the bureaucratic power of the
Party political-legal apparatus, which had ballooned dramatically
under Zhou's chairmanship.'77
173. Interview, in Shanghai, China (Aug. 14, 2011).
174. Interview, in New York, United States (Mar. 6, 2012).
175. Jamil Anderlini, THE BO XILAt SCANDAL: POWER, DEATH, AND POLITICS IN
CHINA (2012). In recent years, Chongqing Party secretary Bo Xilai had made a highly
public bid for a position in the top Party leadership on thc back of two signature
efforts, a populist revival of Maoist propaganda and an anti-crime campaign that ran
roughshod over legal norms. Id.
176. Diamian Graminaticas, China: Trouble at the Top? BBC NEWS (May 15, 2012),
http://ww .bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18070273.
177. Ben Blanchard & Benjamin Kang Lim, China Downgrades Powerful Domestic
Security Chief Position, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 19, 2012. available at
http://wmy.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-china-politics-reshuflebrc8ai0cp-
20121119,0,5893637. story.
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These developments may severely limit the ability of Party
political-legal authorities to carry out a political rectification of
Chinese legal education. Indeed, disarray at the center
introduced an element of caution as early as the late spring of
2012. The rollout campaign for the new "Outstanding Legal
Talent" Program was supposed to have been marked by an
opening conference in May 2012 in Yan'an-the revolutionary
base headquarters for the Red Army during World War I-to be
attended by Party political-legal authorities, the top officials of
the China Law Society and the politics and law universities,
editors of top academic journals, and other legal educators. It
was widely expected that this conference, held in a venue with a
specific historical heritage, would provide conservative officials
an opportunity to push a tougher, more politicized line with
regard to legal education. But it never took place. Invitees
report that Party authorities decided that to adopt a wait-and-see
approach in the wake of turmoil among central leaders. Major
political decisions have been placed on hold until after the
change in central leadership in the fall of 2012.1
Legal education consequently bears watching as a
barometer of political change in China. The ability of Party
political-legal authorities to affect legal education may be an
indication as to whether their influence grows or wanes in the
years to come.
D. Inplications for US Law Schools
What does this all mean for American legal education?
Well, some changes currently underway in China might actually
be worth considering by American educators. Chinese
authorities are comprehensively rethinking legal education.
They are jettisoning the one-size-fits-all evaluation systems that
are at the core of problems in both countries. They are
178. Interviews in Shanghai, China (June 1, 2012) and Beijing, China (July 6,
2012). An opening conference for the "Outstanding Legal Training Talent Program"
was indeed held. but in Beijing, rather than Yan'an. Reports suggest that the content
focused primarily on the educational and technical components of the plan, rather
than the political ones. Li Na, Zhuoy aJfdi rencaijiaoyU peiyang ,ihua qidong [ Oustanding
Legal Talent Education Training Plan Launched], LEGAL DAILY, May 27, 2012, available at
hLLp://legal.people.coi.cn/GB/188502/1 7996815.htiI: Interview. in Shanghai,
China June 1, 2012); Interview, in Beijing, China uly 6, 2012).
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encouraging a more diverse spectrum of law programs to
emerge.179 Should American law schools do the same"8 1
Chinese developments will have an even more direct
impact. American legal education is going over a cliff. Faced
with declining numbers of J.D. applicants, US law schools are
desperately seeking alternative sources of revenue. 81 Many are
turning their eyes to what has been a profitable source of tuition
in recent years-international LL.M. programs.182 China has
been one of the most significant sources of students for these
programs in recent years.'8 3
But this Article calls into question whether simply
expanding the numbers of Chinese LL.M. students will ensure
the long-term viability of American law schools. The large
annual increases in applicants from China that American
admissions officers have become accustomed to seeing since the
late 1990s are directly related to domestic changes in Chinese
legal education: massive growth in total numbers of law
graduates, dismal job prospects, and a spiral of degree
179. Supra note 140 and accompanying text.
180. Other Chinese trends that might be worth considering by US schools
include: reducing the numbers of entering law students, de-accrediting schools with
poor employment prospects and (in the case of the United States, high debt loads),
creating new tracks that permit the hiring of faculty with other than academic
backgrounds, and encouraging faculty to leave academia for periods of time to acquire
practical experience. Naturally, some of these measures resreible existing reform
efforts at some US institutions.
181. REVENUE GENERATION STRATEGTES FOR LAW SCHOOL S, 1-IANOVER RFSEARCH
(Aug. 2011), available at http: / /www.hanoverre search.con /wp-content/uploads/2012/
10 /Revenue-Generation-Strategics-for-Law-Schools-Membership.pdf.
182. Christopher Edley, Fiat Flux: Evolving Purposes and Ideals of the Great American
Public Law School, 100 CAL. L. REV. 313, 329 (2012) (citing "exporting American
legality" as a priority in coming years and calling on American law schools to imagine a
world in which perhaps half of their students are international). For more information,
also see the presidential address by the head of American Association of Law Schools at
the 2012 annual meeting. Lauren Robel. Ass'n for Am. L. Schools, Presidential Address
(Feb. 2012), available at http://wNy.aals.org/docurments/newsletter/february2012.pdf
(noting that the number of LL.M. degrees grew sixty-five percent between 1999 and
2009, and stating "[Ilronically, at a time when US legal education is subject to such
broad domestic criticism, the global attractiveness of US legal education, and a US law
degree have never been higher.").
183. See, e.g., Vanderbit LL.M. Class of 2013: Schools Conferring First Degree of Law,
VANDERBILT L. SCH., http:,//aw.vanderbilt.edu/prospective-students/lim-program-
/Jim-class-of-2013 -profile/1im-class-of-2013-schools/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 22,
2013) (listing mainland Chinesc graduates as comprising roughly half of the entering
2013 1.L.M. class at Vanderbilt Law School).
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devaluation that has made foreign LL.M. degrees attractive,
despite their expense.
This may be coming to an end. Numbers of students
studying law in China appear set to stagnate or decline in
coming years. Students choosing to major in law are generally
weaker than in earlier decades. There may simply be fewer fresh
bodies flowing out of third and fourth tier Chinese schools and
into American LL.M. programs.184
It is also not clear that LL.M. programs will be as profitable
as in the past. As American law schools have printed more
degrees, their value has eroded in the eyes of potential buyers.
The same spiral of degree devaluation that has affected Chinese
domestic degrees is now playing out in US law schools.185 This
has created downward price pressures. Chinese students have
become much savvier in negotiating with US schools for
reductions in LL.M. tuition. Chinese educators are also pressing
for change. At a 2012 conference of US and Chinese law deans,
one of the Chinese participants (in the opening address!)
warned his American counterparts to cut their prices, or face
Chinese schools steering their students to less-expensive LL.M.
programs in the UK, Canada, or Australia. At least one Chinese
law school has successfully negotiated with an American partner
school for a bulk discount rate for its students-thirty percent
off in return for delivering a certain number of LL.M.
students. 1 8
So what is the takeaway for US deans? Is there a future for
selling American legal education to Chinese students? Of
course. Even under existing state plans, a limited number of
Chinese law schools are being steered in the direction of more
globalized legal education. Elite schools such as Renmin
University are expanding their hiring of recent American law
graduates as long-term teachers of substantive law classes offered
184. Or, at the least, there will be nothing rernotely approaching the regular,
annual, double-digit percentage increases in potential applicants that US law schools
have been accustomed to seeing since the late 1990s.
185. Nor has the spiral of degree devaluation stopped with LL.M. degrees. If you
are wondering why your law school has seen surging interest from Chinese students
seeking j.S.D. degrees, it is because this is the new battleground for those seeking an
edge in competition for academic and government jobs in China.
186. Public speeches at thre 2012 Sino-US Law School Deans Forum (June 23-24,
2012).
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in English.187 Programs such as the Peking University School of
Transnational Law are exploring new, less-costly means of
providing American legal education to Chinese students. Top-
tier schools in the United States will still be able to attract
outstanding Chinese students. And given poor investment
options and an uncertain political climate at home, many
Chinese families remain willing to plunk down large sums of
money for their children to enroll in an American degree
program and spend one year in the United States
But the era in which Chinese LL.M. students represented a
cash cow for law schools, requiring little to no investment or
attention, is over. Schools are not simply going to be able to
continue to simply open up seats in the back of their classrooms
to Chinese students, draw hard lines between LL.M. and J.D.
students in terms of providing career services, fail to view LL.M.
students as paying customers fully equal to J.D. candidates, and
still expect to have an unlimited supply of qualified applicants
willing to pay US$50,000 a year in tuition.
Suppose that you are a dean at a second- or third-tier
American law school. If you dramatically expand your
enrollment of Chinese LL.M. students to raise revenue, what will
happen? Quite quickly, you will face tough decisions between
reducing the prices that you are seek to charge (via offering
tuition discounts), lowering your admissions standards, or both.
This author is personally aware of at least one American law
school that has pursued a policy of simply admitting every single
Chinese LL.M. applicant.
To be sure, you may still be able to fill seats using that
model. There is a lot of money sloshing around in China,
looking for a way out. But your student quality and long-term
reputation will suffer. For the most exposed American law
schools-those facing high tuition, poor employment prospects,
declining numbers of domestic applicants-all pretense of
selectivity will simply go out the window as they monetize their
ability to issue 1-20 forms so that international students can
obtain visas. Similar economic pressures have led some US
187. If the downturn in the American legal education market lcads to closings of
US law schools, expect thein to be followed by unemployed law professors seeking new
careers.
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undergraduate colleges to devolve into diploma mills,
generating major corruption scandals.188
It is actually difficult to imagine why similar problems will
not also occur among the weakest American law schools.
Significant demand exists in China for channels to move money
and family members abroad. Expensive, low-ranked American
law schools are under severe economic pressure. Some already
have dubious records of dealing with their American J.D.
candidates.'
For American law schools, the real challenge in the coming
years will be to create reasonably priced programs that actually
improve the employability of their graduates-both foreign and
domestic alike. This requires investment. It requires analyzing
the actual needs of Chinese students and employers. It requires
customizing existing programs to cater to them. And it requires
mainstreaming Chinese students as fully equal customers of
American legal education.'so
188. See, e.g., Lily Altavena & I)aniel Slotnik, Degrees (Without the W1ork) for Foreign
Students at a North Dakota University, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, available at
http://thcchoice.blogs.nytimnes.con/2012/02/10/(dcgrees-without-the-work-for-
foreign-students-at-a-north-dakota-uni versity.
189. It also might be worth considering the potential impact on US law schools if
Party political-legal authorities should manage to carry through on their promises to
take Chinese legal education in a more conservative direction. Several Chinese
ministries have contracted with specific American schools to provide legal education
programs. These generate substantial income. Could a situation emerge where
American schools feel compelled to compromise on their own principles, whether in
educational content or programs, out of a desire to save their revenue striam?
190. For example, one key goal of Chinese students coming to the US for a year-
long LL.M. program is to improve their language skills. But traditional American law
classes are not designed for that goal. In a new environment where some US schools
must aggressively compete for Chinese students to survive, how might they modify their
curriculum to satisfy that aim and attract qualified applicants?
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APPEADIX 1
Legal Education lust Accord with National Construction of the Rule
ofLaw
LEGAL DAILY, Jan. 11, 2012
Kou Guangping & Liu Dawei
Cultivation of Legal Talent lust Meet Current Demands
Since the beginning of the reform period, legal education
in institutions of higher education has developed rapidly.
According to figures published in the 2009 [sic-actually issued
in 2008] White Paper on China's Efforts and Achievements in
Promoting Rule of Law, as of November 2008, China has 634 law
schools or departments, with 300,000 students pursuing
undergraduate degrees in law, 220,000 law students in
vocational colleges, 60,000 students pursuing masters programs
in law, and 8,500 current law Ph.D. students. Development of
legal studies at institutions of higher education in China and the
training of legal talent has already become an important force
for promoting China's democracy and rule of law. And they will
continue to play an important role in developing the rule of law
in China in the future.
However, there are some things within modern legal
education that do not accord with traditional Chinese culture
and the foundations of Chinese society. Modern legal concepts
and legal structures constructed with "rights" (including
"freedom" and "equality") as their core have been excessively
influenced by the two hundred year development history of
Western powers. These do not closely accord with China's
traditions and social attitudes. In a certain sense, the modern
spirit of the law focuses more on protecting "individual" rights,
while China's traditions and basic social attitudes place more
emphasis on upholding "collective" interests. In teaching law at
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institutions of higher education, establishing a value system
based on core concepts of "rights" and "equality" is the
foundation of modern legal education. Otherwise, students will
not correctly grasp modern legal concepts, nor establish a firm
base of legal theory. However, once this kind of value system is
permitted to develop unchecked, it has negative consequences.
Attaining social stability and harmonious social relationships is
not achieved merely by upholding the rights of "individuals" or
"groups." Over the thirty years of promoting rule of law in
China, there has been a negative social manifestation of steadily
increasing litigation and efforts by citizens to contest their
interests and rights. And in recent years, within the legal
profession there has emerged the phenomena of regarding
"rights protection" (weiquan) as higher than all else, with no
concern for social stability. Both of these are byproducts
resulting from the influence of this value system. As a result,
there is a certain discrepancy between the concepts and notions
being developed among law students and China's traditional
culture and social realities. Training legal talent that is
appropriate for China's national character and the needs of
developing China's democracy and rule of law this must be
made the core of efforts in legal education to train legal
talent . . . .
It is worth noting that, as a result of increased international
exchanges and accelerated globalization, the influence of
Western legal theory and legal education on China's legal
education has gradually increased. This has not only affected the
content of legal education, but has also influenced concepts
within certain legislation in China (such as the widespread
dispute in society created by the "people oriented" Traffic
Management Law). Further, in recent years, the majority of new
professors have simply gone from school to school, perhaps with
some background studying abroad. Add to this the limitations of
disciplinary perspectives, and this means that their
understanding of China's social foundations and social realities
in incomplete, and they lack a deep understanding of China's
national conditions. The combination of these factors has meant
that the law students in school have established a value system
and legal concepts that are at some variance with the demands
of social reality. Absent an understanding rooted in the overall
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situation (daju), the national character, and the interests of the
nation, a value system based on "equality," "justice," and
"rights" will frequently have negative consequences for overall
social stability and the direction of social values.
The advance of democracy and the rule of law is an
irreversible long-term trend of social development. Borrowing
and researching foreign experiences and legal concepts of other
countries may be necessary to legal education and research. And
there may be disputes as to whether the construction of Chinese
democracy and rule of law differs from the West. But in light of
the actual demands of our national construction of democracy
and rule of law, there is basic consensus that the core goals of
legal education must be meeting practical needs of society and
ensuring that our students are well-trained.
